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      SUMMARY  
China’s economic expansion in recent years is one of the most important geopolitical 
developments of the 21
st 
century (Mockli, 2007). More interestingly, Africa relations with 
China continue to be of keen concern to many, precisely because these two countries have 
been humiliated severely during the years of colonialism. This study examines, to the extent 
possible, Chinese changing foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa, using 
Nigeria as a case study specifically looking at socio–economic issues. The study uses the 
Hegemonic Stability Theory as a framework of analysis. While the method of data collection 
is premised on existing qualitative and quantitative analysis on Africa–China relations, face-
to-face interviews and one telephonic interview with an expert on Africa–China relations 
were conducted as a method of gathering new data. The present study, finds that China’s 
economic expansion can be detrimental to Africa in many ways. For instance, China 
continues to export to Africa cheap manufactured goods, while extracting raw materials to 
fuel its own industrialization. This situation works against intra–Africa trade, which could 
potentially address the socio–economic issues facing the continent. However, to maintain its 
resource supply and stable market, China’s foreign policy of ‘non–interference’ has changed 
significantly, particularly towards Africa. For example, China recently opened its first 
military base in Africa. This study argues that, because of the above mentioned arguments, 
the repercussions of the Africa–China relations could be dangerous for Africa since the 
continent is not really benefiting from these dealings. Furthermore, this study notes that 
China is contributing negatively towards the socio–economic development of Nigeria, despite 
the fact that it provides Nigeria with aid and loans, primarily for infrastructure projects. 
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China’s economic expansion in recent years is one of the most important geopolitical developments 
of the 21
st century (Mockli, 2007). More interestingly, China’s relations with Africa – a continent 
confronted by uniquely political and socio–economic challenges - have been a subject of discussion 
lately. The subject of Africa–China relations, had and still continues to draw critics and supporters 
alike (Besada, 2013). It is said with hindsight, that China’s assistance, be it aid or loans, comes with 
no set of suggested policies and conditionalities for African countries to implement, except rejecting 
Taiwan as a country (Cheru and Obi, 2010, Idun-Arkurst and Laing, 2007). This is in contrast to 
Western countries and financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) which impose conditionalities,- inter alia Washington Consensus (WC) and 
Economic Structural Adjustment Policies (ESAP) - when assisting African countries, creating 
developmental obstacles (Schiere, Ndikuma & Walkenhorst, 2011).  
The intensification of formal relations since 1971 between China and Nigeria has become a relevant 
issue internationally (Odeh, 2009). Statistics from various sources indicate that Nigeria had and 
continues to benefit enormously from China’s economic growth (Taylor, 2007). In addition, China 
continues to provide aid and loans worth billions of dollars to Africa, particularly Nigeria, in order 
to access gas and oil reserves that it desperately needs to maintain its high annual growth rate 
(Cheru and Obi, 2010). The agricultural capacity of Nigeria as well as its population, which stands 
at 17.7% of Africa’s population providing market opportunities for China’s exports, has encouraged 
China to give Nigeria preferential privileges in its Africa policy (Odeh, 2009). 
Several studies concerning Africa–China relations have been conducted thus far; some examine 
China’s Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) across Africa while other studies focus on China’s loans 
and aid contribution towards Africa (Woltmann, 2013). A few studies documenting China’s 
changing foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa, particularly China’s role in the 
socio–economic development of Nigeria, have been carried out. Therefore, the present study seeks 
to contribute to the examination, to the extent possible, of Chinese changing foreign policy and 





1. 2 Problem Identification 
It is no secret that China characterizes its national security and foreign policy goals in a series of 
principles under the caption of the ‘Chinese dream’ of peaceful development, non–aggression and 
‘non–interference’ in the affairs of other nations (Ramirez and Rodriguez, 2014). However, China’s 
focus on Africa’s mineral resources to fuel its own industrialization continues to raise many 
concerns. For instance, the continuing model of Africa–China relations consists of  “the exchange of 
goods for manufactured ones – which recalls colonialism, as pointed out by some African leaders” 
(Buckley, 2013: 1). The changing posture of China from ‘non–interference’ stance to ‘direct 
intervention’ in most African countries, propelled by economic interest, has taken many in the West 
by surprise and created mixed reactions amongst Africans (Pang, 2009, The Economist, 2013). 
Taylor (2007) points out that what causes mixed reactions, and yet creates confusion among 
Africans, is that China crafted a policy document, first published in 2006 specifically designed to 
deal with Africa. Yet on the other hand, Africa does not have a designed policy document to deal 
with China at a continental or state–to–state level. African countries prefer to trade with China to 
access loans and aid for easing its ever–pressing political and socio–economic challenges (Chileshe, 
2010). Therefore, relations between Africa and China continue in many respects to hinder intra–
Africa trade. 
Mkandawire (2011) among others, argue that the contributing factors leading and forcing African 
countries to trade with advanced nations emanates from the ‘catch up’ syndrome and bad policy 
choices that only equate development as modernity and technological advancement. The ‘catch up’ 
syndrome and bad policy choices that Africa still implements continue to negatively affect the 
socio–economic development of Africa. Yet, intra–Africa trade can play a leading role in Africa’s 
industrial approach and improve the levels of socio–economic development among African 
countries (Gumede, 2013). China’s ‘dumping’ of cheap manufactured products, and increased 
export of migrant labour to Africa has made it difficult for African industries to thrive and to 
compete globally. To mitigate this challenge, in 2012, the Heads of African states agreed to an 
African Union Plan as a mechanism to fast track and boost intra–Africa trade by 2017 (Oloruntoba 
and Gumede, 2014).  
Despite this plan and the production of several Africa policy documents on how to foster regional 
integration and cooperation, intra–Africa trade remains marginal. This is due to many African 
countries relying primarily on China for trade, technological expertise, loans and aid assistance. It is 
worth noticing that collateral payments are used to reimburse the Chinese, which thus far have been 
mineral resources. Moreover, China still maintains this system to the extent that its foreign policy of 
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‘non–interference’ to protect its resource supply over the years had considerably changed, and 
China has had to intervene in the domestic affairs of other nations - more so in Africa (Yifu Lin, 
2009, Pang, 2009). Evidence of this was noted in 2013 when, for the first time, the Chinese 
government dispatched 170 People’s Liberation Army elements under the United Nations (UN) 
mission to Mali. In yet another surprising shift in approach on ‘non–interference’ policy towards 
other nations. China directly intervened by sending a team to South Sudan for mediation purposes 
(Sun, 2014, Pang, 2009, Huang, 2007).  
The objective to consider a detailed analysis of the abovementioned trends is to contribute and add 
value to academic and public discourse debate of the ‘Africa rising’ discourse. The discourse 
suggests that Africa in on the right part concerning its developmental trajectory. The ‘Africa rising’ 
narrative currently is transcending all over the world and different social groups are vigorously 
engaging what it should constitute for it to be realizable. However, this ‘Africa rising’ account must 
be scrutinized. This is because despite what is usually reported about the ‘Africa rising’ story, 
suggesting that Africa’s socio–economic prospects are on the right part - poverty, inequality and 
unemployment persist at horrific levels. Gumede (2013) shows a glaring picture: when comparing 
Africa with South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa is not performing well, with the 
average value of HDI at 0.475. This value is far too low when compared to other regions. 
Moreover, to indicate as well that Africa is not rising as proclaimed by many, the 2014 United 
Nation’s Human Development Index (UNDP) report ranks Nigeria, the second biggest economy in 
Africa, number 153 out of 187 poor countries. The (UNDP) also points out that despite Nigeria’s 
impressive growth in recent years and Africa in general, the number of people living in poverty 
continues to increase unabatedly. Caffentzis (2002: 91) further indicates that “the average sub–
Saharan African can expect to live 14 years less than someone in the next poorest region (South 
Asia), and 30 years less than someone in the industrialized world.”  
This shows that Africa is still lagging behind when compared to other regions of the world, despite 
impressive economic growth over the years. It is necessary to highlight that Africa’s growth in 
recent years has been tied to China’s economic growth as well as the willingness of China to aid and 
loan Africa for infrastructure projects and developmental assistance. Therefore, China’s role in 
Africa’s political and socio–economic development needs to be studied. As mentioned before, many 
of Africa’s achievements in the last three decades are tied up to China’s growth and its persistent 
support and willingness to assist the continent.  However, despite many achievements in the last 
three decades, many Africans continue to languish in poverty and underdevelopment is a defining 
feature. Therefore, the objective of this research is to question the Chinese foreign economic policy 
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towards Africa and to examine the implications of Chinese economic policy on Africa’s socio–
economic development. 
1.3 Research question 
The proposed study seeks to question China’s foreign economic activities in Africa and the role of 
China in the socio–economic development of Nigeria. 
1. 4 Scope of the study 
Relations between Africa and China are a relevant point of departure for this study, and are 
specifically selected for this research because of their common shared background regarding the 
history of colonialism. Moreover, despite their recent past of being colonized, Africa and China are 
the two fastest growing economies in the world (Shelton and Kabemba, 2012). The importance of 
clarifying the scope and the nature of the study is that over the years, many have and still view 
China’s engagement with Africa not as a country-to-country relation. Moyo (2016: 58) captures this 
very well when he states that “in examining China’s presence in Africa, the continent is often 
viewed as one big country or region, despite the fact that the continent has a variegated history and 
contemporary political economy.” 
Therefore, it is of imperative nature to highlight that the scope of the study broadly looks at Africa 
in its engagement with China, and uses Nigeria as a case study. On selecting Nigeria as a case study 
for this research, a number of interesting factors were considered. Firstly, Nigeria is akin to China in 
Asia, due to its geographical and demographic significance, each respected in its own respective 
region (Agubamah, 2014). Secondly, Nigeria at some point (2014) became Africa’s biggest 
economy, surpassing South Africa. However, South Africa reclaimed it first spot in 2016 (Writer, 
2016).  
Gumede (2013) on the other hand, primarily points out that Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) had, over the years, been growing with a margin of 6%, with others pointing a 7% growth 
rate annually. Comparably, this is the highest growth rate in Africa. Thirdly, Chinese companies 
continue to invest billions of dollars in the oil sector and provide loans and aid assistance to Nigeria. 
This is done with the aim of improving the levels of socio–economic development of Nigeria. 
However, the standard of living conditions for many Nigerians continue to deteriorate and 
unemployment keeps on rising sharply. Specific information is well covered by the (UNDP, 2014), 
that Nigeria ranks 153rd out of 187 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index. Although 
Nigeria economy has grown tremendously over the years, poverty and unemployment continues to 
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characterize the Nigerian society. The (UNDP, 2014) further highlights that South Africans are 
more than twice as rich than Nigerians.  
Fourthly, the emergence of militant groups, particularly Boko Haram – an Islamic orientated group 
fundamentally against Western education and liberal values continue to cause havoc in Northern 
Nigeria. Boko Haram uses terrorist methods such as kidnapping of children and bombing public 
facilities. Such terrorist acts place not only Chinese oil interests and other companies at risk, but 
also those of other investors (Abide, 2013). In sum, the four situations described above, provide a 
prospect of using Nigeria as a case study and examining the reliability of the truth on whether these 
challenges indeed create nuisances in Nigeria. This is extremely pertinent because Nigeria and many 
African countries continue to regress and experience recurring problems of poverty, inequality, 
violence, marginalization, extremism, bad governance, weak institutions, ethnic division, religious 
polarization, corruption and terrorist acts resurfacing at a grand scale. Moreover, the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) report (2014: 216) notes that in Nigeria:  
A prominent section of the elite thrives on crony capitalism and patron–client deals in 
violation of the rule of law. Its members are from different ethnic, political and religious 
communities; when they agree on how to share the spoils all is well, but when they disagree, 
they politicize, manipulate and instrumentalize ethno–religious and regional differences. 
With the failure of governance and development, an ever–increasing number of ethnic 
militias, separatist groups and millenarian religious movements are being mobilized, both for 
self–defence and for pressing ideological and practical goals. 
The changing foreign policy of China and its engagement with Africa is a particular concern that 
this study raises and seeks to examine in an effort to ascertain what this means for African countries. 
Although several studies on Africa–China relations exist today, there is not enough literature that 
has dealt sufficiently with China’s changing foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa, 
and the role of China in the socio–economic development of Nigeria. Therefore, the analysis in the 
present study lengthens existing studies in this field and improves the scope to complete the 
growing concerns about the future of Africa and Sino–Nigeria relations.  
1.5 Limitations of the study  
The limitations to this study are that at present it relies heavily on secondary sources. In addition, 
the contending clashing of ideas between scholars regarding the failures and successes of Africa–
China relations makes it difficult for one to strike a balance. This is partly because some scholars 
argue that the Africa–China relation is benefiting the continent through aid, loans and trade deals 
that are not accompanied by any conditionalities. For instance, Kalu (2012) and Ajakaiye (2006) 
argue that China’s investments in Nigeria and on Africa’s infrastructure development are 
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appropriate and thus contribute to the level of socio–economic development. While Aronsson 
(2014), and Ayodele and Sotola, (2014) hold a view that China - like Europeans and Americans - is 
in Africa for extracting raw minerals and further contributing to the de–industrialization of Africa to 
fuel its own industrialization. Alden, Large & Oliver (2008) in a more condescending manner have 
gone too far stating that China is not only interested in Africa’s mineral resources but also interested 
in conquering Africa. This assertion is informed by the argument placed by many that China 
continues with a Western conventional pattern on their relations with Africa exporting raw materials 
and importing cheap manufactured goods. 
Another limitation of this study has to do with the fact that although field work in the form of face-
to-face interviews was conducted, some respondents, particularly Chinese, refused to take part in the 
study. Part of the reason for that is that, in general, Chinese located or working and/or doing 
business in other countries are reluctant in being interviewed. Many of the Chinese, like many 
foreign nationals, assume that such research is political and therefore refuse to participate because 
of fear and victimization of host governments. Babbie and Mouton (2011: 250) captures this very 
well by stating that respondents may “experience it as a spying operative.” This can inhibit some of 
the vital research findings that can be crucial for the study. In many instances, as some of the studies 
show, many refuse to participate even if ethical research standards are met. While conducting field 
work, many Chinese nationals refused to take part in this study. Only one Chinese national agreed to 
be interviewed.  
1.6 Conceptualization of relevant terms 
When conducting social science research, it is important that relevant concepts are clearly spelled 
out, defined and explained. This is because different disciplines may use the same terms, yet not 
meaning and/or implying the same thing in the context of the carried study. Therefore, clarifying 
key concepts is imperative for dealing with any impediments that might arise on what the relevant 
terms mean in the context of the study. For that reason, the terms that are defined to provide clarity 
are: foreign policy, resource diplomacy and measures of socio–economic developments, i.e., HDI 
and GEM. 
 1.6.1 Foreign policy and resource diplomacy 
Foreign policy is a policy pursued by any country that places domestic needs and interests to 
external considerations (Kissinger cited in Landsberg and Schrire, 2008). Landsberg (2010: 15) 
gives a philosophical definition: “domestic policy shape foreign policy in direct ways and could 
therefore place major constraints on foreign policy manoeuvrability.” It is no secret that China’s 
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foreign policy and resource diplomacy is increasingly influenced by its rapid technological 
advancement and economic growth. The need for raw materials to grow the economy without any 
doubt dictates China’s foreign policy. Moreover, China’s foreign policy is used to secure mineral 
resources and to tap into new markets for their thriving manufacturing industry. This for Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) will lead to social stability and ultimately the survival of the CCP (Alden 
and Alves, 2009).  
 1.6.2 Measures of Socio-economic development 
Human development “is the process of enlarging people’s choice as well as raising their level of 
wellbeing” (Gumede, 2010: 4). The HDI is a summary measure for assessing long–term progress in 
three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and 
decent standard of living (UNDP, 2013). Although HDI is widely used as a measurement for socio–
economic development, other researchers question its authenticity because it lacks many measurable 
variables (Gumede, 2013). Nonetheless, it indicates the wellbeing of a certain society and how that 
society is performing in terms of education, healthcare and per capita income. While on the other 
hand, GEM, focuses primarily on women and opportunities given to them in comparison to men 
(Gumede, 2010).  
In Nigeria, just as in many African countries, the HDI and GEM have not sufficiently improved 
when compared to other regions of the world. A variety of factors contribute to the slow growth of 
socio–economic development in Nigeria and Africa in general. For instance, policy choices, weak 
institutional structures and the manner in which they are governed, corruption, nepotism, poor 
education systems, slow pace of innovation and technological development, poor infrastructure and 
uneven distribution of resources across various sectors and social groups (Gumede, 2014).  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
The researcher is of the belief that if African policy makers are equipped with this kind of analysis 
and foresight, they may have the upper hand in dictating terms when entering trade and other 
relations with China instead of having developmental policies being imposed and recommended for 
Africa by external actors. Therefore, African policy formulators, using these forecasts may be able 
to forge their own developmental path that will be consistent with their resources and needs for the 
people of Africa. This will enable African countries, along with Nigeria, to be able to fully develop 
and play an equal role in the affairs of the community of nations. The study will also contribute to 





1. 8 Ethical considerations 
Babbie and Mouton (2011: 520) indicate “that the scientist has the right to the search for truth but 
not at the expense of the rights of other individuals in society.” This means that the people who are 
studied should not be harmed in any way, whether they agree to be studied or not (Babbie and 
Muttoun, 2011). Therefore, in this study, ethical issues considered the need to report all data 
collected without any prejudice or bias. Also, participants were interviewed at their discretion. The 
data collected will be reported with outmost accuracy and in line with academic standards. This is 
vitally important in research because honest reporting helps policy makers to better understand the 
problem, and as a consequence to produce informed policies.  
In keeping up with social science standards, there were no rewards for participants and it was 
clearly explained to them that their participation was voluntary. The researcher explained clearly to 
the participants what the study is about and that there is protection of their identities when reporting 
the findings. The bias of the researcher about the nature of Africa–China relations was 
professionally dealt with by means of reporting the data as given by the respondents. This will 
enable the study to contribute immensely for further research and assist policy makers to create 
policies from a more informed perspective and based on a scientific research.  
1.9 Organization of the study 
This research paper is organized into six chapters and the chapters are as follows: 
 Chapter one: Starts with the introduction, which is followed by a problem statement, aim 
and objectives of the study, research question, the scope and limitations of the study, 
conceptualization of relevant terms, study significance, ethical considerations and the 
organization of the study.   
 Chapter two:  Specifically deals with research methodology 
 Chapter three: Literature and Theory  
 Chapter four: Deals with Africa–China relations in perspectives  
 Chapter five: Case Study Analysis: China–Nigeria relations in detail, with the view of 
showing that indeed Chinese foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa is 
changing and that China’s activities are indeed contributing to the decreasing socio–
economic development of Nigeria  






The above chapter has broadly spelled out why this study is carried. Amongst other things, a clearly 
spelled out problem statement has been given. In the problem statement one can see why Africa–
China relations and the use of Nigeria as a case study were problematized and thus a vital aspect to 
carry out this study. This chapter, in line with academic requirements, had set out clear aims and 
objectives of the study, research question and the scope and limitations of the study. Also the 
conceptualization of relevant terms, study significance, ethical considerations and the organization 






















      CHAPTER 2 
   RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
2. Introduction  
This chapter describes how the data was collected for the purposes of this study, as well as the 
analytical approach used in this study. Methods and rules in research, particularly in social sciences, 
are important guiding principles that intend to provide clarity for the reader. This in turn helps to 
deal with impediments and/or limitations on how to address the research question (Woltmann, 
2013). Therefore, the strategic research approach that can gather sufficient information and link 
theoretical concepts with real world phenomenon is sourced from primary and secondary literature. 
Primary data is when the researcher directly collects information from the population studied or 
informants. While secondary data is when data is collected using articles and various published 
works done by others (Acaps, 2013). 
A mixed method of qualitative and quantitative analysis was an appropriate undertaking for this 
study. Ramalibana (2005) citing Denscombe (2002: 105) indicates that “qualitative data as well as 
quantitative data benefits from corroborating information that can be checked out by other 
researchers; things like dates, times and numbers, records and such as tape recordings.” This chapter 
focuses on the methods and techniques used to answer the research question. 
2.1 Data collection 
The methods of collecting data for this study consisted of face-to-face interviews and a telephonic 
interview, as well as the analysis of secondary literature. These research methods are commonly 
used in survey research (Ramalibana, 2005). Babbie and Mutton (2011: 232) indicate that “survey 
research is the best method available to the social scientist interested in collecting original data for 
describing a population too large to observe directly.” Therefore, survey research method was an 
appropriate tool to use for gathering data in this study. This tool is applied in conjunction with a 
mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative techniques. The advantage of using qualitative and 
quantitative methods is that the limitations of qualitative methods are covered by the strength of 
quantitative methods and vice–versa. De Lisle (2011: 113) further points out that: 
Mixed methods research represents a unique way of seeing and investigating the world; an 
approach that is congruent with philosophies used in naturalistic inquiry. Moreover, in the study 
of complex and multiplex social issues, mixed methods can add to the repertoire of both 
qualitative and quantitative researchers, enabling them to achieve important legitimating goals, 




For this research, most of the qualitative data sourced was gathered from already existing research 
that has been done and published on Africa–China relations. In regards to the quantitative method, a 
thematic approach was employed to analyse numerically data presented by various scholars and 
institutions on Africa–China relations. Braun and Clarke (2006: 6) define thematic analysis as “a 
method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.” This method is used 
to test the hypothesis and to explain certain facts and/or observations. In this particular case, facts 
and observations about China’s changing foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa: 
The role of China in the socio–economic development in Nigeria, were put into test. 
Babbie and Mutton (2011: 249) reminds researchers that “data collection is one of the most crucial 
phases in research process. Errors during this phase can render the whole research undertaking 
futile.” Therefore, face-to-face interviews and one oral telephonic interview were conducted as a 
way of getting the much needed information to address the problem question.  
 2.1.1Face-to-Face Interviews and a telephonic interview 
Several studies conducted on Africa–China relations more specifically on Sino–Nigeria relations 
have been based on secondary material, whether qualitative or quantitative. Understandably so, 
because the nature and magnitude of carrying out large studies need more resources and they are 
time consuming. That is why in many instances, only big and financially stable organizations have 
been able to carry studies such as Africa–China relations. Nonetheless, that does not mean one 
should not go to the field because of limited resources. Consequently, for this study, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted. 
It is worth mentioning that face-to-face interviews have pros and cons. On one hand, researchers 
like Rouston, Demarriars & Lewis (2003) indicate that interviews are difficult in many ways. For 
example, Babbie and Mouton (2011) highlight the difficulty accompanied with face-to-face 
interviews in which respondents “may experience it as a testing situation or as a reflection of the 
government’s interest in their well–being and have high expectations, while others may experience 
it as a spying operative” (Babbie and Mouton, 2011: 250). Also, Phellas, Bloch & Seale (2011: 182) 
highlight the disadvantages of face-to-face interviews:  
 The cost associated with face-to-face interviews can limit the size and geographical coverage 
of the survey. 
 Interviewers can introduce bias, which will affect the reliability of responses. Such bias 
might emerge from the way in which questions are asked, or in the personal characteristics 
of the interviewer, or in respondents’ wish to give socially desirable responses. For instance, 
there tends to be an over–reporting of voting activity and of participation in voluntary 
activities in data gathered through interviews.  
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On the other hand, in the same work, Phellas, Bloch & Seale (2011:182) indicates that face-to face 
interviews are beneficial in many ways. For example:  
 The presence of an interviewer allows for complex questions to be explained, if necessary, to 
the interviewee. 
 Interviews can generally be longer than when self-completion techniques are used as 
interviewees are less likely to be put off by the length or to give up halfway through.  
 There is more scope to ask open questions since respondents do not have to write in their 
answer and the interviewer can pick up on non–verbal clues that indicate what is relevant to 
the interviewees and how they are responding to different questions.  
 Visual aids can also be used in the face-to-face situation. 
 The interviewer can control the context and the environment in which the interview takes 
place. For instance, the interviewer can make sure that the questions are asked and therefore 
answered in the correct order and that the interview takes place in an appropriate setting 
which is conducive to accurate responses. 
After careful examination of the pros and cons of face-to-face interviews, the researcher chose this 
method as one of the ways to extract data. As pointed in the above affirmations, it is evident that 
face-to-face interviews produce quality data that will be helpful to the findings of the study. 
However, notwithstanding the disadvantages, the researcher is aware that proper planning and 
organization is an imperative tool when using face-to-face interviews as an instrument to extract 
data. Therefore, communication and explanation is vital in this process and the researcher should 
truthfully indicate the purpose of the study and never make any false promises to the respondents. 
To further gather data on this crucial study, one oral testimony in the form of telephonic interview 
was conducted. This interview was conducted with one expert on Africa–China relations. One of the 
fundamental reasons of conducting a telephonic interview with just one scholar was to enrich data. 
Telephonic interviews are appropriate for a number of reasons. Firstly, telephonic interviews can be 
easily arranged. Secondly, telephonic interviews can reach people who are far and in most cases 
geographically isolated (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). That was the particular case in this research, as 
the interviewee resides and works in China. Without exception, the researcher notes the 
disadvantages of telephonic interviews such as sampling errors and the quality of information 
gathered among other things. However, proper planning and organization curtailed such 
disadvantages. 
 2.1.2 Secondary literature 
As stated at the beginning of the Data collection section, apart from using face-to-face interviews 
and a telephonic interview, analysis from existing data done by various institutions and academics 
was also used for this study. Some of the data collected examined China’s role in the socio–
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economic development of Nigeria, and utilizes HDI and GEM statistical data to qualify the results. 
To derive such information, the uses of multiple institutions with credible data collection such as the 
United Nation Population Division (UNDP), the United Nation Education, Science and Cultural 
Organization for Statistics, the World Bank and the National Bureau of Statistics were used. These 
indictors measure both the HDI and GEM of Nigeria and assess whether or not China’s role is 
contributing to the decline of Nigeria’s socio–economic development. The institutions mentioned 
above, drawing from the UNDP, (2013: online) calculate HDI by: 
 A long and healthy life, is measured by life expectancy. Access to knowledge is measured 
by: i) mean years of education among the adult population, which is the average number of 
years of education received in a lifetime by people aged 25 years and older. ii) Expected 
years of schooling for children of entry school age, which is the total number of years of 
schooling a child of school–entry age can be expected to receive if prevailing patterns of 
age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child's life. Standards of living is 
measured by Gross National Income GNI per capita expressed in constant 2005 international 
dollars converted using purchasing power parity rates .  
GEM = indexed EDEP for parliamentary representative + Indexed EDEP for economic participation 
+ indexed EDEP for income.  
The purpose of the use of these two indices (i.e. HDI and GEM) in the present study was to provide 
first an in–depth analysis of how different groups are affected by China’s activities in Africa, 
particularly in Nigeria’s socio–economic development. In sum, the use of research findings from 
archived studies as well as face-to-face interviews and the opinion of one academic who has and 
continue to do extensive research in the field, can establish the validity of the final findings. 
2. 2 Population target and sampling  
This study focuses on Africa–China relations and uses Nigeria as a case study. Therefore, to make 
sure that the target population represented the demographic population and the location of the study, 
the researcher decided to interview 15 Nigerians, 15 Chinese, and one expert who had and continues 
to focus his/her research on Africa–China relations. The targeted population was located in their 
respective geographical areas. Ramalibana (2005: 31) highlights that choosing the population in the 
same area “save time, money, and correspondence, compared to a target group which is scattered at 
different locations.” The target population that was interviewed was situated at Chris Hani 
Baragwanath and China mall. Fortunately, these places are both located in Johannesburg. These 
specific areas were chosen because Nigerians are mostly found at Chris Hani Baragwaneth, and 
Chinese are usually located in China mall.  
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Both groups, daily conduct their business at these places. It must be clear that it would have been 
impossible to interview all Nigerian and Chinese nationals precisely because of the capacity to reach 
out to all of them, as well as financial constraints. For these reasons, a ‘snowball sample’ to identify 
the interviewees was deemed appropriate to gather sufficient and rich data responding to the 
problem question. The ‘snowball sample’ in short is a referral technique, where one member of the 
group that the researcher intends to study refers the researcher to other members of his/her same 
group. Elder (2009: 7) captures snowball sampling very precisely:  
In some communities (especially those in developing countries), the only feasible way to 
find its members is by asking other members. The first step in this procedure is to find a few 
members of the population using any method. This step is denoted as the first round. Then 
you ask each of these first-round members if they know of any others. The names given will 
form the second round. Then you go to each of those second-round people, and ask them for 
more names. This process is repeated for several more rounds. The process is stopped when 
you start hearing about the same people over and over again.  
Snowball sampling makes it very easy to locate the intended population that a researcher wants to 
study, which would have been impossible to track by oneself. Still, Snowballing requires a lot of 
work (Elder, 2009), but fortunately, in this case the referrals to which I was referred to were within 
the same geographic areas and as a result the process was very easy 
2.3 Pre–testing the method  
Pre–testing the instrument is important when conducting research. During this phase the researcher 
can be able to see whether the instrument will work or not. Moreover, the researcher can be able to 
spot mistakes during this process and address them before doing the actual field work. Therefore, as 
part of pre–testing the instrument, the researcher decided to interview 10 random African nationals. 
The reason for that was to make sure that the instrument was indeed effective and to make sure that 
the questions contained in the questionnaire were clearly understandable.  
The importance of that is to make sure that the wording used in the questionnaire is correct and 
other impediments that the researcher might not be aware when creating the instrument can be 
spotted and corrected. It is for the above reasons why the researcher considered testing the 
instrument before going to the field. Therefore, the questionnaire is clear and is relevant for probing 
more on China’s changing foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa, particularly 
China’s role in the socio–economic development of Nigeria. 
2.4 Conclusion   
The chapter above had decisively dealt with the way in which data was collected. As indicated 
earlier, data collection is an important aspect of the research. This is precisely because methods and 
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rules are guiding principles seeking to provide clarity and respond to the research question. 
Therefore, the above chapter had spelled out how data through the use of primary and secondary 
methods was collected. Firstly, a mix method approach of qualitative and quantitative method of 
data collection was instrumental for this research for simple and clear reasons - that the strength of 
qualitative aspects balances the weakness of quantitative approach and vice-versa. The use of face-
to-face interviews as one of the strategic way of collecting data together with its advantages and 
disadvantages was explained. The target population as well sampling technique were also described. 
The latter method was pre–tested in order to make sure that the questionnaire is appropriate as the 























      CHAPTER 3 
   LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
3. Introduction  
This chapter looks at the literature review and theoretical framework. Literature review much like 
research design and methodology is an important aspect when conducting research. What makes 
literature review an important aspect of research is that here the researcher revisits other scholars 
work regarding the topic under investigation. This is not an easy task because scholars always have 
contrasting views regarding any matter. For instance, and in this particular case, some scholars view 
China’s changing foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa as an established 
partnership that benefits both parties. 
Conversely, others hold a view that Chinese presence in Africa is holding back development and 
further contribute to the socio–economic decline of Africa in general and that of Nigeria in 
particular. To unpack these contrasting views, existing literature from books, academic articles, 
newspaper articles and policy documents that provide an overview on Africa–China relations will 
be carefully reviewed. In hindsight, it must be noted that some opinions, especially those from 
column writers and various commentators, also use to condense an overall impression on what other 
people have to say about Africa–China relations.  
The theory section follows immediately after literature review. The theories that are selected for this 
research will not be confined to one discipline, primarily because the nature and the complexity of 
this study cannot be addressed within the precincts of theories emanating from the same discipline 
(Hunts and Thornsbury, 2014). Therefore, in order to analyse and address the identified problem 
adequately, different theories from a number of disciplines are a suitable approach. Controversial as 
it might be, a number of theories used in the field of Development Studies were not designed with 
the intention to look at things from the stand point of Africa and developing countries. In short, 
theories used within Development Studies, have been contextualized from the historical context of 
Europe and with the view of top down approach suggesting that solutions to address African 
problems should come from the West. Therefore, it becomes difficult for these theories to help us 
understand the problems facing Africa and how to resolve the problems that have been tearing 
Africa apart.  
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) helps us to better understand why theories used in Development 
Studies are not helpful when analysing Africa and the rest of developing countries. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
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(2012: 48) informs us that “Development Studies is analysed as a product of global imperial designs 
and technology of subjectivation, which masquerades as emancipatory while in reality serving the 
perpetuation of coloniality.” Moreover, Ndlovu-Gatsheni gives a well round up argument by 
pointing out that “Development Studies is terribly affected not only by the heavy empiricism but 
also by a failure to distinguish between alternatives to the systems and structures that generate 
underdevelopment and the alternatives within the same systems that lead to development dead-
ends”( Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 59).  
For these reasons, well captured by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, it will be difficult to use any of the theories 
from Development Studies as a theoretical framework guiding this thesis. This is not to undermine 
theories from this discipline, but to provide the alternative system that Ndlovu-Gatsheni spoke 
about. Therefore, a best possible theoretical framework as required for this complex study is 
deduced from other disciplines, such as Political Science and International Relations. This approach 
is commonly known as ‘multi–disciplinary approach’ in Social Sciences and Intellectual Discourse. 
Theories discussed in this thesis are premised on power dynamics and development approaches 
seeking to address issues of socio–economic development in Africa and other developing regions of 
the world. 
3.1 Literature review  
China’s foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa have been and still are controversial 
in many ways. These issues continue to generate debate in many circles globally, especially in the 
media fraternity. Scholars as well have intensified their research output and, as a result, extensive 
literature on Africa–China relations to uncover this unprecedented relationship exists in abundance. 
The impressive economic expansion of China from the early 1970s challenged the already 
established United States of America (US) and Western powers. In 2010 matters became more 
complex and dynamic as China surpassed the US to become the largest trading partner in Africa. 
This major milestone signalled in practical terms the rise of Chinese hegemony, with China 
overtaking US (the current hegemony) as number one trading partner in Africa. Many saw China as 
the next superpower with an alternative part to development. 
As indicated earlier, in addressing perspectives on literature generated thus far on Africa–China 
relations, there are two competing schools of thought to look at on the nature and scope of Africa–
China relations. The first group view Africa’s relations with China optimistically and indicates that 
China’s aid, loans and trade investment continue to assist Africa to address political and socio–
economic issues. While the second group perceives China’s intrusion to Africa as a new ‘imperial’ 
power, with a colonial project seeking to re–colonize Africa (Naidu, 2008). For the agitators of the 
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re–colonization thesis, the prospects of China raising the standards of living and thus the level of 
political and socio–economic development of Africans are limited. These competing views are put 
into test carefully, without being short sighted on the vast literature covering many aspects on 
Africa–China relations. Thus, I have opted to limit myself to only these two schools of thoughts, 
which focus on the positive and negative aspects of Africa–China relations, particularly and 
explicitly as it concerns political and socio–economic issues. Within these various competing 
schools of thoughts, there are shortcomings often called ‘literature gap’ in research, which will be 
highlighted and addressed. 
 3.1.1 Africa-China relations as negative 
I will start the literature review with Carmody and Taylor (2010), who assess China’s economic 
expansion, and interestingly note that China’s internal resources no longer meet China’s domestic 
needs and demands. Despite having huge reserves of minerals, China’s aggressiveness and hunger 
for resources continues unabatedly. The Chinese Department of Science and Technology and 
International Cooperation of the Ministry of Land and Resources in 2012 published Guide to 
Investment in China’s Mineral Industry. This guide comprehensively covers the whole Chinese 
resource economy. To cite an important aspect of this guide at length, see the following extract from 
the Guide:  
 China is rich in mineral resources. By the end of 2011, 172 kinds of mineral resources have 
been discovered in China. Among them, 160 kinds of minerals have proven reserves, 
including 11 kinds of energy mineral, such as petroleum, natural gas, coal, uranium, 
geothermal, and shale gas, etc., 54 kinds of metallic mineral, such as iron, manganese, 
copper, aluminium, zinc, etc., 92 kinds of non-metallic mineral, such as graphite, 
phosphorus, sulphur, and sylvite, etc., and 3 kinds of groundwater and gas mineral, etc. 
There are about 18,000 known mineral deposits throughout the country. Among them, about 
7, 200 deposits are large-medium sized 
These resources, however, are not adequate enough to supply China’s economic growth. The 
expanding middle–class as well as industrialization and urban migration are some of the reasons 
why China is not meeting its energy needs despite having many mineral resources (Jain, 2009). 
Therefore, China had to look for alternative ways to access the much needed resources to fuel its 
surging economy. Fundamentally, on these bases, China’s foreign policy had to change to adjust 
with the modalities and realities of its surging economy.  
Bijian (2005) is one of the authors that continue to ponder on China’s foreign policy in the context 
of the ever dynamic, changing and interconnecting global community. Bijian (2005) published an 
instructive article titled “China’s peaceful rise to great power status”. This article helps us to better 
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understand the ways in which China had been transforming itself from an underdeveloped society to 
a modern nation.  
Among the many arguments that Bijian (2005) exposes, a salient one is that China’s ineffective 
strategy of energy extraction had to be reviewed and renewed. Hurst (2006) further elaborates on 
Bijian’s (2005) argument by noting that China needs all of today’s resources, primarily oil for 
development and industrialization. Ayenagbo (2015) also adds to the discussion that China’s 
strategic move on resource diplomacy focuses more on oil producing countries. In his paper titled 
“China’s Rising Demand for Minerals and Emerging Global Norms and Practices in the Mining 
Industry”, Li (2006: 5) extrapolates China’s quest for minerals in the 21st century and states that: 
China’s search for minerals extends across the globe. China has been most aggressive in 
Africa, where mineral deposits are relatively untapped and the need for Chinese investment 
is particularly great. China also has secured access to large reserves of mineral resources in 
Latin America, historically a major region for international mineral exploration for both 
precious and base minerals. In Southeast Asia, China greatly expanded its presence through 
trade and security cooperation, while gaining access to large reserves of mineral resources. 
China’s mineral interests do not end with Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. China 
has important oil interests in Iran and Russia. Those ventures, however, have been more 
limited in scope 
It is evident from the above citation that China is all over the world in search of mineral resources to 
fuel its own industrialization. For African countries, China’s quest and persistent search for 
minerals, which are in abundance in the continent, is welcomed. This is because China gives Africa 
an alternative source of markets which were previously dominated by US and Europe. For example, 
today China not only imports oil from Africa, it also imports iron ore, cotton, diamonds and other 
vast minerals found in Africa (Ayenagbo, 2015). 
Despite China’s effort on assisting Africa, there are those who still view China as having the same 
intention as those of US and the West. That is to only extract raw materials and send cheap 
manufactured goods. Tjonneland, Brandtag & Kolas & Pere (2006) published a report titled “China 
in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies”. In this report these 
authors make an interesting and yet controversial case. They assert that China’s involvement in 
some parts of Africa is to provide the regime (CCP) with resources to oppress the population. Butts 
and Bankus (2009) in this context negatively stress as well that part of the reasons for China’s 
renewed involvement in Africa is a need for Africa’s mineral resources, which by large and far 
should supply its surging economy. Manji and Marks (2007) then place this in perspective saying 
that China is tremendously benefiting from Africa’s mineral resources, yet on the contrary, Africa is 
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not benefiting from China. This is because China continues to import mineral resources and export 
manufactured goods (Hook, 2012).  
Alden, et al (2008) in a more condescending manner goes further and points out that China is also 
interested in conquering Africa. Alden, et al (2008) and his peers analysis’ is informed by the 
argument and perspective put forth by many that China continues with US and Western 
conventional patterns on their relations with Africa, i.e., importing raw materials and exporting 
cheap manufactured goods. In the process, Africans are the ones who are not benefiting and 
continue to suffer. 
Similarly, some political actors who make decisions and sign deals with Chinese, seem worried 
about Chinese engagement with Africa. South African President, Jacob Zuma, is under pressure at 
home because of high unemployment and complaints from opposition parties because of poor 
performance of the industrial sector that is not protected from Chinese cheap imports. President 
Zuma, then highlighted at the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in 2012 that 
trade between Africa and China is unequal with Africa still exporting raw materials while importing 
manufactured goods, and such a pattern is worrying and problematic. Making this point at such an 
important forum was remarkable because here all African heads of state, government officials and 
other important players were present. The financial package that China often tables in these 
consultation meetings makes African heads of state to agree with this conventional parting of give 
and take.  
The FOCAC was designed with the intention of checking the decisions agreed upon between Africa 
and China. However, Mkwezalamba, former commissioner for Economic Affairs for the African 
Union Commission, points out that the lack of an institutional structure that will serve as a follow up 
mechanism compromises FOCAC and renders it to a toothless institution (African Union 
Commission, 2010). In the same vein, Nigeria’s former Central Governor warns Africa of China’s 
aim of imperial intentions, wherein China takes raw materials from Africa and send back 
manufactured goods, without transferring skills (See the Economist, 2013 - Africa and China: More 
than minerals). Such an outcry had been advanced not only by political leaders who make decisions 
on behalf of their respective countries. African academics point out this reality as well. Gumede 
(2014) for instance, warns African countries of this kind of conventional pattern.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013), a respected African historian and philosopher, in his book Empire, Global 
Coloniality and Africa Subjectivity, also warns African countries about the “increasing rise of 
Chinese imperialism, which its Chinese ideologues articulate as based on a win–win approach 
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compared to Western economic interventions that were predicated on a donor–recipient 
relationship” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013 :8). 
The article “China has become big in Africa. Now for the backlash” published in the Economist 
(2015) on Chinese investment in Africa, explains in full detail the pitfalls of China in Africa. It 
singles out the developing mistrust between various African countries towards China. For example, 
the article points out that China promised to transform the Uganda Lake Victoria free trade zone 
into a world class eco–city with a price tag of $1.5 billion. The eco–city was set to have an airport, 
houses and industries amongst other modern facilities. However, the multi–mega project set to be 
built by China did not materialise (Economist, 2015). 
This gives an indication that African engagement with China might be at the expense of African 
states, thus compromising socio–economic development. Moreover, China’s new role in Africa and 
the South: A search for new a perspective, a book edited by Guerrero and Manji (2008) indicates 
that China is killing Africa’s industrialization. The decline of an industrial sector in Africa has had 
severe effects on the development and the wellbeing of the people of Africa. These effects include 
retrenchment of workers in key industries, and slow down of development and economic growth. 
A number of countries, particularly US and its allies fully agree with the argument put forward by 
Gumede and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, which states that China’s role in Africa might be at the expense of 
Africa. Firstly, many in the West quote China’s commitment of upholding human rights in Africa as 
being problematic. China, unlike the US and European countries, does not hide under humanitarian 
reasons to pursue its economic interest. This had and continues to result in the former dominant 
trading partners with Africa to question China’s real intention in Africa. Yet on the other hand, 
China is rhetorically consistent with its policy position of ‘non–interference’ towards other nations. 
Thus, for the US and its counterparts, China is using this policy to pursue its strategic 
developmental goals. Whether a country is ruled with an iron fist or democratic means, China does 
not get involved in the internal affairs of that country. Therefore, it expects the same: that no 
country intervenes in its domestic affairs.  
The international community has therefore criticized China’s neutrality to places where human 
rights are not upheld and democratic institutions are trembled upon. In some parts of Africa, there 
are incidents where political dissents are not allowed. Ploch (2011) consider these issues to be 
amongst US interests on the continent. It is from the above reasons, that Western countries have 
often criticized China’s undemocratic policies, as well as external engagement with Africa. Former 
Secretary of State and the democrat front runner for the US presidency in the last elections, Hilary 
Clinton, in 2011while visiting Zambia insinuated that China’s presence in Africa is a new–
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colonialism. Such remarks by a high profile political actor cannot be taken lightly because of the 
privy of intelligence information at her disposal. However, they cannot be accepted as an 
omnipotent truth because China is seen by many in the West, including Clinton, as a rival (Quinn, 
2011).  
The colonial discourse trumpeted by Clinton and Western followers arose out of the observation that 
“China’s relations with Africa replicate and reinforce the established patterns that are unfavourable 
to African development” (Alden, Large & Oliveira, 2008: 2). The statement made by Clinton is a 
profound admission that Africa was and is still subjected to different forms of economic oppression 
and exploitation. In justifying the assertion why China is in Africa, the US and its Western 
counterparts seldom state that China wants to feed its manufacturing industry with customers and 
extract raw material from Africa.  
Tjonneland, Brandtzag & Kolas & le Pere (2006) published a study which is of interest because it 
deals with many issues affecting Africa–China relations. Their study highlights disturbing concerns 
that China is even selling arms to conflict ridden areas such as Sudan, DR Congo, Zimbabwe and 
Liberia, amongst others. Tjonneland, et al, (2006: 13), further state that “several of these supplies 
have been in exchange for lucrative contracts, such as mining concessions in DR Congo and timber 
concessions in Liberia.”  
The recurring internal clashes, terrorism and civil unrest in some parts of Africa, help China’s arm 
manufacturing industry to flourish. Although China is not the biggest arm supplier to regimes that 
have a bad record of upholding human rights and dictatorship, the fact that it sells arms to regimes 
prone to oppression and undermining human rights sets a bad precedent on China’s engagement 
with Africa. It also affirms that China’s foreign policy towards Africa is driven by capitalist/market 
motives. Although research points out that the US is a country benefiting from selling weapons to 
dictatorial regimes in Africa (Kriston, 2011).  
Arm sales by the US and now China perpetuates wars in the continent and in the process stifles 
Africa’s industrialization and intra–Africa trade. These unfavourable patterns of colonial injustice 
continue to make Africa vulnerable to the global economic system. Hence, to this day, many 
African countries are still undeveloped and rely heavily on aid, loans and FDI. Such a worrying 
pattern aggravated the view on this issue of the Japanese Prime Minster, Xinzo Abe on his visit to 
Africa in 2014. Prime minster Abe warned African countries stating that China is only interested in 




 3.1.2 Africa–China relations as positive 
Now then, positives outcomes on the Africa–China relation have also been documented. For 
instance, the credit openness (open check book) of China to Africa in the form of aid, loans and 
trade to access resources provides the much needed socio–economic relief for many African 
countries. Moreover, China had and still helps the continent with its infrastructure programme. One 
of the major infrastructure projects referred as “China’s gift to Africa” at the cost of $ 200 million 
was the African Union headquarters located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Ighobor, 2013). This mega 
building is part of China’s commitment to help Africa achieve its awakening renaissance. 
Sun (2014) is among the many scholars that view Africa–China relations as a win–win partnership. 
For Sun (2014) China’s investment in key areas of African economies indicates that Africa is a 
desirable destination for investment. In the last few years, from 2012 to 2015 China provided Africa 
with an aid package of about $20 billion (Sun, 2013). Such an aid package is happily welcomed by 
African governments, more so because no conditionalities are attached to it.  
Ayodele and Sotola (2014), also in a positive light, detail the benefits of Africa–China cooperation. 
They point out that unlike the West; Chinese are not imposing themselves on African countries. 
These scholars proclaim that generally this relation is beneficial to both parties. Moreover, Ayodele 
and Sotola (2014) categorically make an important observation by indicating that China is investing 
on manufacturing, health and industrial sectors. These are crucial sectors that Western countries 
have been reluctant to invest. 
Western countries often make excuses on why they don’t invest in these crucial sectors of African 
economies, citing risks and unfavourable environments due to civil wars, unrest and political 
instability (Huse and Muyakwa, 2008). These impediments cited by Western countries seem not to 
trouble China as it still invests on Africa’s critical sectors. Therefore, this is part of the reason why 
many in Africa are more lenient to China than the West. Obiorah’s (2008: 4) paper, in which he 
interrogates the “Rise and Rights in China–Africa Relations”, fully comprehends why African 
governments view China more as a partner than a ‘new–colonialist’ as others point out. This author 
states that:  
 For some among Africa’s contemporary rulers, China is living proof of ‘successful’ 
 alternatives to Western political and economic models. The semi-colonial Western 
 domination of pre–revolutionary China is often cited in some circles in Africa as broadly 
 comparable to Western colonialism and neo–colonialism in Africa. In particular, the 
 governance and economic ‘conditionalities’ imposed by Western donors and the 
 international finance institutions (IFIs) on African governments seeking loans and aid are 
 often approximated to the ‘unequal treaties’ imposed on China by the West in the 19th 
24 
 
 centuries. China’s status as a developing country in the 1950s through the 1990s is often 
 cited by some in Africa as corresponding with Africa’ s post–colonial experience. 
Another positive point of view on the Africa–China relation has to do with the fact that Chinese 
intelligentsia and government officials differ with the narrative suggesting that China is in Africa as 
an ‘imperial’ nation. Yifu Lin (2009), along with his contemporaries, blames Western scholars for 
trumpeting lies claiming that China is in Africa for resources. An interesting argument is that 
Western governments are fearful of Africa–China relations because their chances of accessing 
markets in Africa will and in fact had already dropped by a significant margin. Li Anshan (2007: 
71) also agrees that it is Western propaganda that China is in Africa for natural resources and states 
that: 
From 1949 to 1978, China’s policy toward Africa focused mainly on politics, fully 
 supporting the independence movements in Africa, which went beyond mere moral 
 support and extended to the provision of weapons and human assistance to cultivate 
 military and political power for the movement. Following the wave of national 
 independence  throughout most of Africa, China sought Africa as an ally in its struggles 
 against imperialism and hegemony. During these times of political orientation, economic aid 
 was provided to Africa even though China’s own domestic economic circumstances were far 
 from optimal. 
Sun (2014) shares the same reasoning that China’s goal in Africa had never been driven by 
economic interests, and states that China assisted Africa for the past six decades without extracting 
mineral resources. This, for Chinese intellectuals, government officials and Chinese business 
community, indicates that China had and continues to be committed in helping Africa. Obiorah 
(2008) further goes on saying that African leaders never saw China as an ‘imperial’ force or a 
country that seeks to conquer or to dominate Africa. For instance, leaders such as Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania in the 1960s and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, immediately after dismantling the colonial 
state, they established ties with China and more so learned the socio–economic models of China, as 
part of nation building. 
Moyo (2016) in his article “Perspectives on South–South relations: China’s presence in Africa”, 
examines various schools of thoughts on Africa–China relations. Out of his informative analysis, 
Moyo takes a bolder stance and argues that the assertion that China is re–colonizing Africa or acting 
as an ‘imperial’ power is false. He then elaborates on the centrality of this thesis, which is “mainly 
posited by various liberal Western scholars and is widely ﬂoated in the mainstream media, as well 
as by some African scholars, using the epitaph of the destructive dragon” (Moyo, 2016: 59). Yet, 
there is much evidence on the ground that states that China is far from colonizing Africa. Moyo 
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further explains this by pondering on the scramble for African land by external actors in Africa. For 
example Moyo (2016: 64) argues that: 
 China does not dominate the land grabbing in most African countries, despite its extensive 
 foreign reserves. For instance, in Ethiopia, India is the dominant grabber of land, the 
 dominant new actor. In North and South Sudan, it is the transnational’s that are dominant 
 players. In Tanzania, European countries are dominant. Furthermore, the dynamics of the 
 scramble for African resources has become much more complicated than often recognized. 
The quest for Africa’s resources by major powers has become more complicated than ever before, 
as they are seeking to have their own share. The West which has been dominating on Africa’s 
extraction is now uncomfortable about China’s inroads in Africa. The reasons for African countries 
to further strengthen ties with China in recent times are many. For instance, African countries rely 
heavily on FDI, aid and loans that are not accompanied by conditionalities. Although both 
competing schools of thoughts highlight with a degree of persuasion their point of views, there is 
urgent need to pose questions on why such controversies exist.  
Firstly, is China’s foreign policy towards Africa, which is premised on resource diplomacy, in 
reality going to result in a win–win situation? Or is Africa giving China mineral resources to spite 
the US and the West? Or is Africa seeing China as a country that can assist it in addressing socio–
economic issues? There is enough literature that deals with China’s foreign policy and resource 
diplomacy towards Africa and the role of socio–economic development in Nigeria. Such literature 
covers a wide range of issues that fill the gap of these two competing views. The views of these 
scholars, along with their competing view offer sound theoretical lens in relation to the study, thus, 
helping to answer the question under investigation.  
 3.1.3 Perspectives from the South  
A number of respected scholars - such as Molefe Kete Asante, Walter Rodney, Yash Tandon and 
Romon Grosfugarl, cover in detail the challenges facing Africa, many of which were inherited 
during the years of slavery and colonialism. Moreover, they discuss how Africa should engage with 
the outside world post–independence era to improve the life conditions of African people. The 
works of two scholars, who thus far have and continue to ponder on socio–economic models for 
African developments, are used briefly to show that literature is in abundance: namely, Vusi 
Gumede and SabeloNdlovu-Gatsheni. The reason for using only these two scholars is because their 
works cover the African condition not only at the political and socio–economic level of which this 
study is confined, but they extend their scope to question the notion of power relations, knowledge, 
tradition and cultural existentialism.  
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Before unpacking these scholar’s views, it is important to note that most African academics are 
shaped by Western epistemological paradigms. Therefore, it is difficult for them and the structures 
of academia to accept those who challenge Western epistemologies. Those who present alternative 
epistemic views are systematically and viciously victimised and side-lined. Prah (2015: 9) puts this 
in perspective in the following sentence: “the poignancy of this issue is that Western scholarship 
informed – and continues to inform – a large body of African scholarship, despite its partiality and 
bias.” It is therefore, necessary to highlight this point and respond with alternative literature, in this 
case, coming from two outstanding African scholars.  
I will start the discussion analysing “The Role of Thought Leadership, Thought Liberation and 
Critical Consciousness for Africa’s Development” by Gumede (2015). This article represents a great 
contribution to Africa’s political and socio–economic development, what makes it interesting is that 
it traces, in a more amplified manner than many, a history of Africa. It then proceeds to highlight 
why African countries today find themselves in the current state of predicaments and provide the 
much needed solutions for Africa’s socio–economic development. Gumede (2016) cites external 
forces, primarily the influence of policies, as part of the problem inhibiting Africa’s development. 
Gumede’s work covers what needs to be done by African economies to address the challenges 
besieging Africa and its people. In 2010 (Gumede) published a penetrating opinion piece titled 
“Africa’s Achilles heel: Global Socio-economic and Political Order”. In this work, Gumede states 
that for Africa to address its political and socio–economic quagmire, a set of comprehensive policies 
responding to the African condition are needed. His argument goes as follows: 
African leaders have adopted cosmetic approaches to addressing the problem that the 
continent faces. Rather than taking fundamental decisions that can alter the balance of power 
in favour of the people of the continent, most post–colonial African leaders with very few 
exceptions, have not only betrayed the hopes and aspirations of the people, but played to the 
gallery of so–called foreign powers (Gumede, 2010:online). 
The absence of leadership in this regard should be placed into question: why after 54 years of 
Africa’s independence, both the old and new powers are still making decisions on behalf of the 
African people? An approach to the answer to this question could be grasped from the works of 
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, a historian and philosopher whose work is instrumental as well for anyone 
interested in understanding structures of power, knowledge and being. In his article titled “Global 
Coloniality and the Challenges of Creating African Future”, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2014: 183) states the 
following: 
The African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 envisions an African future of pan–African unity, 
integration, prosperity, and peace. This vision is placed in the hands of African people as 
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drivers and dynamic forces operating within the global arena. Pan-Africanism is identified as 
the overarching ideological framework for unity, self-reliance, integration, and solidarity 
(African Union 2013). This future will not be a game of chance. It will be a product of 
present day struggles ranged against coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and 
coloniality of being as constitutive elements of global coloniality. Thus, thinking deeper 
about the possibility of Africans creating their own futures, taking charge of their own 
destiny, and mapping their own autonomous development trajectory reminds one of Karl 
Marx’s arguments about people making history but under circumstances they have not 
chosen. This is the situation within which Africans are struggling to create African futures. 
They are doing so within the context of global coloniality. This means that for the AU to its 
Agenda 2063 it has to struggle ceaselessly against global coloniality. Only after defeating 
global coloniality can the AU then lead Africans in creating African futures. 
The latter analysis by Ndlovu-Gatsheni is crucial because many scholars and the literature in general 
fail to accurately capture the scope of coloniality in their analysis. Gumede and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
are among the pool of African scholars that have and still produce extensive literature on how 
Africa should engage with both the old and emerging powers. I decided to use the work of these two 
African scholars to indicate that there is indeed vast literature produced that responds to African 
urgent challenges. The discussion of these works will be elaborated further in the course of the 
study. 
3.2 Theory  
Analysing China’s changing foreign policy and resources diplomacy towards Africa and its role in 
the socio–economic development of Nigeria requires sufficient understanding of theories. As 
indicated earlier, the nature and the complexity of this study influenced the researcher to use a 
‘multidisciplinary approach’. The shortcomings of theories found within Development Studies 
played a profound role in choosing a theory from another discipline to guide this research. To start 
with, the Hegemonic Stability Theory covers very well the themes and patterns in this study. 
Therefore, its relevance for guiding this study is suitable and serves as an umbrella theory.  
Since a ‘multidisciplinary approach’ as a way of sourcing the best theory was used, there also are 
two more important theories that provide a useful framework and some of them are taken from 
Development Studies. Modernization Theory provides a nuance view as well as understating 
China’s peaceful, and yet forceful rise in a contemporary global setting. This is because for many 
scholars, key drivers of development lie with modernization such as modern infrastructure, 
technological advancement and equipped military capabilities amongst other things. Dependency 
Theory as well, is also a helpful theory to assist analysing various themes and patterns within the 




 3.2.1 Hegemonic Stability Theory 
The motivating factor for using Hegemonic Stability Theory as central in this study is that, on one 
side, it describes a dominant state at the international scene and, on the other side, it describes rising 
states challenging the dominant states. China’s rise in this regard is no doubt challenging the US 
hegemony and decreasing its influence around the world. More specifically in Africa were the US 
has been enjoying dominance for almost 25 years since the end of the Cold War. Another factor 
influencing the use of Hegemonic Stability Theory as a guiding theory for this study, is that Africa 
is “the one and only international region or sub region where the world’s four major powers–China, 
Japan, Russia and the US - uneasily meet and interact and where their respective interests coalesce, 
compete, or clash in a situation-specific way” (Liu, 2011: 405). For these reasons, Schoeman (2007) 
makes an interesting observation: over the past few years, scholars and analysts found it more 
challenging to characterise the Chinese role in the international system and its relations with both 
developed and developing nations. Layne (2008: 13) gives a full account on why this is the case and 
thus states:  
Indeed, the prevailing view among policy makers and foreign policy scholars today is that 
America’s economic, military, and technological advantages are so great that it will be a 
long time before US dominance can be challenged. There is mounting evidence, however, 
that this view is mistaken, and that, in fact, the era of American hegemony is drawing to a 
close right before our eyes. The rise of China is the biggest reason for this. Notwithstanding 
Washington’s current preoccupation with the Middle East, in the coming decades China’s 
great power emergence will be the paramount issue of grand strategy facing the United 
States. Whether China will undergo a “peaceful rise”—as Beijing claims—is doubtful. 
Historically, the emergence of new poles of power in the international system has been 
geopolitically destabilizing. For example, the rise of Germany, the United States, and Japan 
at the end of the nineteenth century contributed to the international political ones that 
culminated in two world wars. There is no reason to believe that China’s rise will be an 
exceptional.  
The abovementioned statement is provocative in many ways when contextually analysed. The 
statement shows that China’s rise in today’s setting will have profound implications in global 
affairs. It will either impact positively or negatively in the socio–economic development of its 
subordinates, particularly those whom it has close ties with. History, however, shows that relations 
between big powers with smaller states are at the expense of the latter. Africa is no exception and it 
is profoundly implicated by China’s rise as China has strategic vested interests. Chinese ascendency 
as the second biggest economy, overtaking Japan and subsequently becoming the biggest trading 
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partner with many regions of the world, changed the course of power and influence at the 
international level (Morrison, 2015: Liu, 2011). 
What makes China’s rise an interesting phenomenon is well captured by Bijian (2005: 20): “some 
emerging powers in modern history have plundered other countries’ resources through invasion, 
colonization, expansion, or even large-scale wars of aggression.” Yet, China’s rise thus far had been 
peaceful and driven by capital, resource acquisition and technology (Bijian, 2005). One can sum it 
up by saying that Chinese rise had been thriving through the force of persuasion. These 
developments indicate the inevitable - who many in the West contest, that China is the next 
hegemony. Morrison (2015) citing a United Nations Report (UNR) indicates that China is now the 
leading manufacturer with value added basis at 35.1% higher than the US. This data corroborates 
that China will be the next hegemony. China’s manufacturing output means it will have to battle for 
new markets - as is already the case-, which are to some extent dominated by old powers. This had 
on numerous occasions led China and the US to be confrontational, particularly when it comes to 
Africa.  
Despite the slow growth in the global economy, China continues to outclass the US in a number of 
areas. For example, China is now the biggest exporter of textile goods (four fifths of the world’s 
production), and the number one steel producer in the world. China also surpassed the US on 
importing strategic resources such as platinum, oil, gas and other mineral resources (Haroz, 2011). 
Furthermore, Nye (1990) gives a nuanced view by arguing that the US decline started in the 
twentieth century. Kindleberger (1981: 242) is among the first group of scholars, who primarily 
hold a view that “hegemony is necessary (though not sufficient) condition for provision of the 
collective good of international economic stability.” This signifies that a dominant state should take 
responsibility by providing leadership with a view of stabilizing the international system and be 
influential on the socio–economic wellbeing of others.  
Liu (2011) expands on Kindleberger’s view of hegemony by quoting Keohane (1984: 32), who 
holds a neo–liberal note of hegemony, saying that hegemony “must strive for control over raw 
materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets and competitive advantage in the 
production of highly added goods.” Keohane’s (1984: 32) definition symbolizes China’s 
engagement with Africa as it is striving “for control over raw materials, control over sources of 
capital, control over markets and competitive advantage in the production of highly added goods.” 
Now then, realist perspectives in this regard, have and continue to be used more predominantly to 
analyse how countries seek to maintain power, both at regional and international levels. Mingst 
(2008), traces scholars who have greatly contributed to realism and later neo–realism. Philosophers 
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such as Thucydides, Saint Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau, Waltz, Gilpin and 
Mearsheimer are amongst those who have contributed profoundly to realism and later neo–realism. 
In spite of all their differences, they all agree that states are driven by national interests in a world 
characterized by anarchy (Mingst, 2008).  
In regards to the neo–realist perspective, it cannot be used to analyse China’s economic rise. The 
theory cannot fully explain China’s contemporary ‘hegemonic rise’ and its role in the socio–
economic development of Nigeria. Realist and neo–realist perspectives have fallen short in 
analysing the peaceful co–existence of states, therefore dispelling the phenomenon that countries 
can ascend peacefully in being hegemonic; nevertheless it is the case with China so far. Yilmaz 
(2010) helps us to understand the concept of hegemony better, by employing Antonio Gramsci’s 
hypothesis of the concept hegemony. For Gramsci, hegemony is when a country becomes powerful 
in the international system or at a particular region. (Yilmaz, 2010). Antoniades (2008: 2) agrees 
with Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony in that it “implies a great capacity for coercion 
and/or a degree of influence or control of the structures of the international systems.” Schoeman 
(2007: 74) goes into details to give central tenants of the Theory of Hegemony, which are shown as 
follows:  
 A hegemony strives for domination in and of the international system, or, at the very least, 
domination or control in its own region, whilst attempting to prevent another great power/s to 
dominate other regions;  
 In materialistic terms, such a state would have superlative economic, military and political 
power;  
 Its political power would have some institutionalised international recognition, indicated by its 
role in international institutions;  
 It would provide certain benefits (e.g. public goods) to other members in the system;  
 It would provide a leadership role which would be directly related to its values and accepted by 
other states in its sphere of influence; and  
 It would act to maintain and expand its role and position in what it determines to be its sphere of 
influence.  
When taking into account the characteristics of hegemony as spelled out by Schoeman and relate 
them to China, to some extent, it is clear that China is the next hegemony. It commands with a full 
degree of influence in Africa and continues to expand its sphere of influence in many parts of the 
world. However, China is not yet a fully-fledged hegemony when compared to the US. The 
difference is evident when one comparatively puts China and the US at play. The ascendancy and 
maintenance of the US hegemonic power is kept through military supremacy and cultural 
superiority. On the other hand, China’s rise has happened through peaceful and persuasive means. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that China’s consistent rise and the US’s continuous decline is opening 
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doors for China to play more of a hegemonic role globally. Agubamah (2014: 64) even notes that 
“no doubt, the US is the strongest nation on the world stage, but China is ruling the world’s 
economy in the 21st century.” China’s financial muscle plays a huge role in Africa’s wellbeing. 
Many African leaders have shown that China is stronger than before by using China to avert certain 
extended internal problems and to resist the US and Western influences. For example, “China has 
consistently used its veto power in the Security Council to protect Sudan against international 
sanctions and to provide support for Al-Bashir’s government, thereby obstructing UN attempts to 
end the carnage in Darfur” (Schoemani, n.d :6). Although, as indicated earlier, it cannot be 
proclaimed that China is a fully-fledged hegemony - precisely because it still does not meet all the 
needs of its people-, China has still managed tremendously to transform and to eradicate the 
embedded impulse of poverty and unemployment for many of its people.  
Dellios (2005) notes such fundamental changes in China’s economy and therefore acknowledges 
that its international status, recognition and standing in the global community have sharply risen. 
Therefore, to understand China’s contemporary rise, one has to understand it within the framework 
and context of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, challenging the dominant state at the international 
level. Centrally, this constitutes the tenants of Chinese hegemonic rise in the contemporary world of 
politics and global setting. Its military power, possessing nuclear capability, having massively 
transformed to meet those standards of the US, Britain and Russia with full range and delivery 
modes, are among the key indicators, that China is a ‘hegemony’ in its own right. China has defied 
the US on a number of occasions, just to mention a case in point; China opposed the US intentions 
of regime change in countries such as Zimbabwe, Iran and Venezuela (Friedberg, 2011). Fearing 
that if such intentions succeeded, China might have fallen victim to such regime changes, which 
serves the US interest. China’s resistance towards the US and helping to sustain vulnerable regimes 
have won China many friends in Africa. 
In sum, Hegemonic Stability Theory as a central framework is appropriate for this study. This is 
because China’s socio–economic rise since the 1970s happened without giving into the pressure of 
Western countries nor did China become concerned about the US liberal ideology of 
democratization. Moreover, without threatening other states militarily, or use physical force, China 
has become a hegemony, which makes the use of this theory appropriate (Breslin, 2011).  
 3.2.2 Modernization Theory 
Modernization Theory is a main branch of economic liberalization and development, it started in the 
1950s rooted on capitalism. This framework to some degree explains Africa–China relations 
(Matunhu, 2011). Tipps (1973: 200) trace well the origins of Modernization Theory and states that:  
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The proximate origins of modernization theory may be traced to the response of American 
political elites and intellectuals to the international setting of the post-Second World War 
era. In particular, the impact of the Cold War and the simultaneous emergence of Third 
World societies as prominent actors in world politics in the wake of the disintegration of the 
European colonial empires converged during this period to channel-for the first time, really-
substantial intellectual interest and resources beyond the borders of American society, and 
even of Europe, into the study of the societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. During 
the two decades after the war, American social scientists and their graduate students, with 
the generous support of governmental and private agencies, turned increasing attention to the 
problems of economic development, political stability, and social and cultural change in 
these societies.  
The above statement proves that Ndlovu-Gatsheni is correct when stating that theories within 
Development Studies are designed to treat Africans as subjects rather than actual participants. In the 
wake of the African decolonization process and post–cold war period, Americans and Europeans 
took the responsibility of reconstructing Africa and generally third world countries. The 
Modernization Theory, in this regard was seen as an opportunity for third world countries to catch 
up with Western countries.  
Modernization agitators were and are still of the view that Africa is underdeveloped. Therefore, for 
Africa to develop and to modernize, Africa should adopt and replicate Western strategies of 
development. Such strategies that African countries need, should follow the Rostowian theory, 
which assets that underdeveloped societies should go through a number of stages to achieve 
development (Matunhu, 2011). There are five stages that Rostow (1959) believes can transform 
societies from underdevelopment to be more developed, modern and affluent societies. 
These stages are, 1) Primitive society: This first stage is based on barter exchange and subsistence 
farming. 2) Preparation for take-off: Where production, specialization, skills development and 
infrastructure development is encouraged. 3) Take off: This stage, switches from agriculture to 
manufacturing. 4) Drive to maturity: In this stage, a society is well off and less reliant on foreign 
imports. 5) High mass consumption: The service sector dominates this stage and a nation is highly 
developed (Matunhu, 2011). These stages for Modernization theorist are stages that any 
underdeveloped society should go through before becoming developed. 
Interestingly enough, the misgivings of these stages are well located in the Chinese hegemonic rise. 
China did not in any way go through this set of suggested stages, yet it modernized dramatically in 
the turn of the twentieth century. However, Western countries still enforce development along the 
lines of Rostow philosophy. Green (2008: 1) places the Modernization Theory in the context that it 
is a “transformational process which enables traditional societies to become modern societies. 
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Modernisation Theory can be related to the Theory of Evolution.” The evolution that modernization 
espouses must take place in the scientific area, technological advancement and infrastructure 
development. A society should advance in these eras for it to ascend as a modern society. Therefore, 
in the eyes of the West, Africa is a backward continent on many important areas used to measure 
development, modernization and to an extent civilization.  
Many Western countries, even international institutions such as IMF and WB, hold the view that 
underdeveloped nations have to go through the Rostow stages of development. For this reason, and 
historically for that matter, Western countries made it their task to craft Africa as a replica of their 
own world. To achieve such a mission, from conquering tactics - such as enslavement in the 1600s 
and the subsequent colonization in the 1800s-, to contemporary neo–colonialism and imperialism of 
African people were and are still strategies systematically employed in every form and shape. This 
is done by Westerners enforcing their values, identities, cultures, traditions and their own languages 
on Africans (see Ngugiwa Thiong’o: Decolonizing the Mind. The politics of language and culture). 
Modernization Theory - approved through policy influence - and aid precondition in Africa -
influenced by the Marshal Plan doctrine - caused extreme poverty, underdevelopment and 
perpetuated inequalities at a mass scale (Matunhu, 2011). As a result of these severe consequences, 
African countries are sceptic of Western assistance because of the mistrust that emanates from 
classical colonialism. Contemporary interventions to Africa - by both old and new powers - 
continue to use Modernization Theory as a guiding principle. For example, Chinese investment in 
Africa focuses on infrastructure modernization and technological development. Green (2008) 
captures this well as he makes an interesting link of Modernization Theory and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs, like Rostow’s stages of development, failed to address 
the socio–economic development of African countries.  
By linking Modernization Theory and MDGs, Greens shows that socio–economic measures within 
MDGs were still focusing on the same measures that many African scholars contest. MDGs were 
using HDI as its prime measure of poverty reduction, life expectancy and adult literacy (Green, 
2008). Critics of Modernization Theory, point out that third world nations cannot follow the 
Western development trajectory. Third world countries are still experiencing exploitative stages, 
having started from slavery to current imperial domination. Western countries on the other hand, did 
not experience what Africa went through. So it would be difficult for Modernization Theory to work 
for Africa. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) highlights the verity that colonial powers went further than 
colonizing Africa and Asia by positioning their cultural values to make them superior to others. 
Former colonial systems and structures are still prevalent and intact in post–colonial Africa, and it 
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seems the continent is battling to undo colonial and imperial structures that come along with 
modernity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). 
China is developing and modernizing rapidly, and thus employing colonial tactics in African 
countries is to some extent problematic. As argued above, China provides aid and loans in exchange 
of and access to raw materials. It is appropriate to argue that Dependency Theory, a critique of 
Modernization Theory is applicable to describe Chinese modernization, which is premised on 
exploitation and imperialism.  
 3.2.3 Dependency Theory  
China is developing rapidly and gaining financial muscle that enable it to provide aid and loans for 
exchange of and access to raw materials. Therefore, it is appropriate to argue that Dependency 
Theory is applicable to illustrate Chinese rapid development rooted on neo–liberal policies, which is 
premised on exploitation and imperialism. The logic of Dependency Theory had always been drawn 
from power external actors exploiting poorer states. Tony (1981) is relatively correct when he 
asserts that he “ha[s] no difficulty, for example, accepting the proposition that in their struggles for 
political and economic change, the poor of the third world usually find their local enemies are 
drawing strength from their international connections” (Tony, 1981: 756).  
This indicates that internal capitalism creates a favourable environment for external states and 
multinational companies to exploit third world countries. Dependency Theory arose in part as a 
reactionary tool to Modernization Theory, which holds a view that all societies should follow 
Western conventional patterns of development and that without Modernization Theory no country 
ever in the world will succeed. Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Claude Ake and Walter Rodney, 
are vicious critics of the Modernization Theory and are amongst the proponents of Dependency 
Theory.  
There’s empirical evidence showing that China and many European countries extract raw materials 
from Africa and in return, send manufactured products and finished goods (Agubamah, 2014, Alden 
& Large & Oliveira, 2008). Despite this uneven trade patterns, desperation for aid and other forms 
of assistance, has led African countries to rely on China’s prosperity for their own legitimacy and 
development (Peet and Hartwick, 2012). Therefore, to a certain degree, Africa relation both with old 
and new powers is unequal, with Africa depending on these powers for its development. Chilcote 




 By dependency we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is 
 conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is 
 subjected.  
To add on Dos Santos argument, Dependency Theory, conditions a situation with which poor 
economies solely depend on developed economies for their development. In this case, Nigeria and 
the whole of Africa are the former and China is the latter. Dependency Theory argues on a neo–
Marxist view that contact with the West, akin to that of China, may bring development and 
modernization to African countries, but that comes with exploitation and poverty. The effects of 
Chinese inroads are now being felt in many parts of the continent. Chinese exports manufactured 
goods as well as labour, and the reaction of Africans towards Chinese exports is starting to indicate 
that it is premised on dominance, exploitation, extraction of raw material and shipping of cheap 
manufactured goods (Peet and Hartwick, 2012).  
Dependency Theory may seem as an appropriate theoretical tool to use when analysing African 
states with emerging or dominant powers. However, it is no longer applicable as a way of 
understanding relations of African countries with any global power. This is precisely because it not 
only does assume Africa as a “quivering victim of external forces” (Kalu, 2012: 5), but it suggested 
to a certain degree that Africa is still a victim of direct colonialism. It further suggests that Africa 
cannot on its own discretion seek an alternative part of development or sources of generating 
revenue without relying on emerging and global powers.  
Moreover, Dependency Theory is irrelevant because it fails to account for other factors that 
influence socio–economic development in developing societies (Kalu, 2012). For such reasons, 
Dependency Theory cannot be used as a framework guiding this study. However, Dependency 
Theory remains to some extent an explanatory factor when taking into consideration that “China’s 
race for Africa is certainly due in large part to the same causes as Europe’s 19th century scramble – 
the need for raw materials to fuel industrialization” (Manji and Marks, 2007: 5). Many African 
countries continue to beg for aid and loans in exchange for raw materials, so instead of applying 
Dependency Theory as a framework guiding this study, it is appropriate to analyse Africa–China 
relations based on power, influence and impact. 
3.3 Conclusion  
This chapter covered yet other two vital aspects of research, which provide a clear map of the study: 
literature review and theoretical framework. Reviewing existing literature provided a more informed 
perspective for the study. Many scholars, as indicated above had and continue to have various 
positions about the nature and the scope of Africa and China. Some argued that Africa–China 
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relation is a win–win situation. On the other hand, other researchers viewed Africa–China relations 
as not mutually beneficially for African countries. With all the arguments by the two schools of 
thoughts, a literature gap using the work of two African scholars was filled. On the theory part, 
Hegemonic Stability Theory, as a framework guiding this study was explained in details and the 
motivating factor for using it. Modernization Theory and Dependency Theories were also discussed. 
The importance of discussing these two theories, which fall within Developmental Studies, were 





















      CHAPTER 4 
   AFRICA–CHINA RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE  
4. Introduction  
This chapter focuses on Africa–China relations, it deals with the question of who benefits between 
Africa and China, and accordingly various African countries will be assessed on how they engage 
with China. Thus, a detailed and informative perspective can be reached on the controversies 
surrounding the Africa–China relation. This chapter will start by describing historical and 
contemporary relations of Africa–China relations. It then proceeds to discuss China’s foreign policy 
and resource diplomacy towards Africa. It also highlights Africa growth rates to see the implications 
of China towards Africa. Lastly, this chapter unpacks the varieties between Pan Africanism, 
Communism and Capitalism. 
4.1 Historical and contemporary Africa–China relations 
When analysing Africa–China relations, one should not fall in the trap of mistakenly taking Africa 
as a single country or a region. This is because China is engaging Africa on a country to country 
basis. Moyo (2016) contextualizes this very well and states that “the presence of China in Africa 
today is broadly differentiated according to China’s varied historical reﬂections with different 
African countries in terms of trade, investment and security concerns” (Moyo 2016 :59). Therefore, 
Africa–China relations should be understood in this context.  
Traces of cultural relations and economic interactions between Africa and China can be traced back 
to primordial times (Filesi, 1972). Exact historical perspectives on Africa–China relations indicate 
that it all began when Zheng He, “a eunuch administrator and diplomat during the Ming Dynasty 
(1368–1644) in Imperial China, arrived on the East African coast several decades earlier than Vasco 
da Gama” (New Africa Magazine, 2015). This indicates that relations between Africa–China have 
long been established. 
Although Africa–China relations can be traced centuries back, Uchehara (2009) asserts that Africa 
and China reconnected with each other in the second half of the 20th century, specifically, at the 
1955 Bandung Conference between Africa and Asia. In this Conference, precedence was set for 
Africa–China cooperation and subsequently all African countries present adopted five principles for 
cooperation with China. The areas of cooperation were (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; (2) mutual non–aggression; (3) non–interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
(4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence (Uchehara, 2009). These five mutual 
agreements adopted at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the willingness of China to assist 
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Africa even when having its own internal problems, created a strong connection between Africa and 
China. For example, Fernando (2007: 364) mentions a number of projects that China did for Africa, 
even when China was not well off financially: 
In 1964 China extended a loan of US$ 22.4 million to Ghana and a grant-cum-loan of US$ 
45.3 million to Tanzania. It also pledged aid commitments of US$ 17.8 million to Kenya, US 
$26 million to Congo, US$ 4.1 million to the Central African Republic, US $8.1 million to 
Mali, and US$ 80 million worth of project equipment to Egypt. 
These financial commitments of China towards Africa drastically increased over the years. Looy 
(2006) is among those who agree that in the past few decades Africa–China relations grew 
tremendously. Looy (2006) further categorizes the last five decades of Africa–China relations into 
three phases. The first phase is when Africa was fighting for independence in the 1950s. The second 
phase, which also marks China’s first diplomatic relations with Nigeria, is 1971, the same year in 
which China gained a permanent sit at the UNSC (Odeh, 2010). African countries played a major 
role in supporting China to get a UNSC permanent sit. This placed huge responsibility at home and 
abroad for China’s global stature. The third phase is during the 1990s, the post–Maoist phase 
characterised by China’s liberalization and economic growth promoted by Deng Xiaoping. 
Kohli (2009) agrees with Looy, and further narrows Africa–China relations down to two critical 
phases of the last five decades of China’s peaceful rise and development. The first phase was the 
role of China in Africa during the cold war era and secondly, the growing perception that China’s 
inroad in Africa is mainly motivated by its quest for oil and other natural resources. Kohli’s (2009) 
views generated anti and pro sentiments among scholars, policy makers, politicians, economists and 
analysts on who benefits mostly out of Africa–China relations. Therefore, China’s foreign policy 
towards Africa will give a clear indication on contemporary Africa–China relations. 
4.2 China’s foreign policy towards Africa: Continuity or Change  
As indicated earlier by Landsberg (2010: 15) “domestic policy shapes foreign policy in direct ways 
and could therefore place major constraints on foreign policy manoeuvrability.” Since the 1970s, 
China’s foreign policy has been under spotlight due to its reform programmes. At the core of this 
issue was China’s persistent proclamation that its foreign policy is driven by ‘non–interference’ 
towards the affairs of other countries. This posture is amongst other key elements of China’s foreign 
policy objectives. 
Other aspects that China considers important on its foreign policy manoeuvrability, is mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations. Moreover, mutual non–aggression, 
equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence towards all the nations are also proclaimed as 
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a corner stone of China’s foreign policy (Uchehara, 2009). These foreign principles served well to 
African leaders who after inheriting post–colonial state, have and to this end continue to complain 
about continuous interference by Western countries. Former South African President Mbeki, even 
warned of the re–colonization of African countries by Western nations. Mbeki cites amongst other 
things, military intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast as some examples, all of which were driven 
by economic considerations and selfishness from Western countries (Duggan, 2012). Western re–
colonization intentions in some parts of Africa and regime changes, although successful in some 
countries, have been challenged unabatedly by emerging countries. For example, China had on a 
number of occasions sided with South–Sudan on the UNSC. On the other hand, China, akin to the 
West, is displaying its power and using the same imperial tactics to influence countries to their 
vision. 
Not long ago, China exerted pressure on many African countries regarding the Dalia Lama debacle. 
For example, South Africa denied Dalia Lama an entry because of external pressure and influence 
from China (BBC, 2011). This is another indication showing that Chinese power, negatively 
impacts other countries. The Chinese government views countries that allow Dalia Lama an entry to 
their own territory as interfering with its internal affairs and thus using economic power to side-line 
such countries. Although the South African government denied this, it is clear that it opted to 
safeguard its economic interest with China instead of pleasing human rights advocacies that regard 
China as a human rights violator. This kind of pressure is rooted solely on Chinese power and 
hegemonic status. 
In a policy document (published in 2006) designed to deal with Africa, China makes it clear that it 
is interested in accessing African mineral resources, but then again it goes further than that to seek 
political cooperation and stability between the two parts (Uchehara, 2009: 96). It also highlights that 
its objective is to help Africa with the much needed developmental aspirations, as this would indeed 
address the question of unemployment through trade and other forms of assistance which will create 
jobs. China knows very well that Africa’s stability will serve well its interests, as it would 
uninterruptedly be able to import raw materials and successfully export manufactured goods. Moyo 
(2016: 60) one of the renowned scholars in this issue also indicated that: 
Chinese ﬁrms have stepped up their scramble for African resources during the 2000s. 
Chinese Mining Capital is increasing its presence across a range of commodities. For 
instance, in Zimbabwe, Chinese interests in mining include chrome, diamonds and platinum. 
Nonetheless, South African and American and companies remain the dominant investors in 
these minerals within Southern Africa. China is a signiﬁcant investor in Zambian copper 
40 
 
alongside Western and Chilean investors. However, in countries such as Angola and Nigeria, 
the dominant foreign investors in mining are from the West. 
Figure 1. Important raw material exporters in Africa which China has advantage of accessing.  
 
 *Source. 2013, UNCTAID Handbook of statistics  
Figure 1 clearly indicates why China in its quest for development made Africa a strategic partner. 
The abundance of mineral resources found in Africa, many of which are still untapped, have and 
continue to attract world powers. It is for such reasons that China centrally made Africa a strategic 
partner. Figure 1 captures very well the nature of Africa’s resources that many countries, more 
specifically emerging countries, are fighting for. When looking at the map and the signs pointing 
out which countries have certain resources, one would observe that the list starts with 15 countries 
in Africa that are rich in oil. These countries receive more attention from China. This is because, oil 
forms part of China’s strategic foreign policy objectives, in comparison to other resources seen from 
figure 1.  
During the 1990s China realised that its surging economy, accompanied by infrastructure 
development, needed more energy, which it was no longer self-sufficient to provide for its 
population. (Lee and Shalmon, 2008). To meet these expectations, Lee and Shalmon (2008): state 
that China employed three strategies, firstly “differentiate Chinese initiative from those offered by 
Western governments and their companies”; secondly “leverage China’s comparative advantages 
while downplaying its disadvantages”; and thirdly, “focus on those countries in which there was a 
high probability that oil reserves would grow and where China could negotiate arrangements that 
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catered its long–term interests” (Lee and Shalmon, 2008: 111). In 1997, China responded to its 
energy crisis by reconstructing pre–existing gas and oil companies to two big companies, namely, 
Chinese National Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPECT) and China National Petroliam 
Corporation (CNPC). These companies have much more advantage in Africa than the Western and 
African companies respectively, precisely because China uses government–to–government financial 
assistance through aid and loans to influence African governments to give their state owned 
company’s oil fields with long–term leases (Lee and Shalmon, 2008). 
Such economic power accompanied by financial strength continues to weaken Africa on many 
aspects of continental development. For instance, intra–Africa trade had been minimal, and as stated 
before, this is not positive since it forms one of the key pillars of continental economic development 
and integration. At the same time, this measure limits Western access of both mineral resources and 
the market. It is for this reason that many Western governments and private companies have 
complained about China’s conduct in its relations with Africa to the extent of accusing China of 
undermining peace and stability in Africa. This arose out of the view that China engages even the 
most corrupt governments in Africa, who in turn uses China’s assistance for corrupt ends of 
accumulating wealth and crush opponents. 
However, many scholars have turn to state that China’s foreign policy of ‘non–interference’ to other 
countries is changing, particularly in Africa because of the investment it has put on the continent. 
Now, citing one of our first hand sources, Respondent 8 from Nigeria, agree as well that China’s 
foreign policy had changed over the past few years. The Respondent 8 also points out that the 
implications for that are good for Africa because China’s interactions with Africa are bringing some 
positive developments in Africa. In detail, this Respondent said that Chinese goods are affordable to 
many African citizens. Moreover, the respondent highlights that China’s infrastructure programmes 
have assisted Africa profoundly and that it has improved the movement of goods from rural to urban 
areas. Therefore, parts of the latter reasons pointed out by Respondent 8 are influencing China’s 
foreign policy to change. Pang (2009) even goes further to say that China’s foreign policy is 
changing because of its growing statue at the international political economy. To quote Pang (2009: 
238) at large:  
Beneath its persistent rhetorical commitment to non–interference and non–intervention, 
however, in practice it seems that China is changing its position in relation to international 
engagement with political and humanitarian crises and is rethinking its stance on 
international intervention. Most notably, since the end of the Cold War, China has gradually 
become increasingly involved in multilateral interventions mandated and organized either by 
the UN or other appropriate regional organizations operating with the UN Security Council. 
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As a result, China has become one of the largest troop contributing countries to UN peace 
operations, contributing more troops to UN operations than the other permanent members of 
the Security Council with the exception of France. China has also made a commitment to 
assist in supporting multilateral post–conflict reconstruction efforts in many ‘civil war’ torn 
states and societies. As the Chinese people gradually go global for business, education, 
travel and employment, the Chinese government has been forced to recognize that protecting 
growing Chinese overseas interests requires a more outward looking and engaging foreign 
policy that supports global and regional institutions that help resolve 
international/transnational disputes including such ones between the Chinese and others. In 
addition to China’s growing engagement with the UN, China and the US have been 
effectively exploring foreign policy and security cooperation in areas such as nuclear non–
proliferation, anti–terrorism, and other areas of shared concern. 
However, to argue against Pang, China’s ‘non–interference’ rhetoric proclamation has been used to 
counter the US, which used economic power and military supremacy to directly or indirectly enact 
regime changes in many parts of the world. Events have unfolded where in the US had lied publicly 
for regime change purposes. For example, under Bush administration, lies were peddled that 
Saddam Hussein regime had weapons of mass destruction. However, the US knew very well that 
Iraq did not have such weapons or the capacity to develop them. The underlying motive was regime 
change in order to tap into Iraq’s oil fields that Hussein nationalized.  
The events in Libya, under the administration of President Obama also point out that the US will 
stop at nothing to crush what it regards as undemocratic regimes. Moreover, there is also substantive 
evidence at hand, showing that the US have on a number of occasions unilaterally bypassed the UN 
to advance its selfish interest -thus using power irresponsibly, knowing that no country could match 
them economically and military wise. Mbeki (2016) gives a number of accounts where the US 
aggressively abuses its power to invade oil and resource rich countries, despite the UN position, 
which usually goes against the US intentions. For example, Mbeki (2016: 11) asserts that: 
Gorge W. Bush, Bill Clinton, everyone, they’re the great democrats who must democratise 
the world, the Middle East, going into Iraq in 2003, Bush and Blair were busy saying we are 
bringing democracy. These are the same people who would not respect the outcome of a 
Palestinian election, which resulted in Hamas emerging as the bigger political formation - no 
we will not accept that democratic outcome, but we want democracy in the Middle East. It’s 
exactly this view, what we want must be what policy becomes for everybody.  
Therefore, China, a communist nation, is well aware of those intensions, thereby using ‘non–
interference’ policy to serve well their intention of maintaining communist status quo. Nonetheless, 
China’s foreign policy has not changed, particularly concerning Africa. History shows that during 
the struggle for African liberation against colonialism and apartheid domination, liberation 
movements were directly supported by China through arms and other financial means (Meredith, 
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2006). Such support constituted direct intervention to the internal affairs of other nations. Kwesi 
Prah, (telephonic interview – conducted, May/ 10/ 2016) captures this very well that:  
China stance with ‘non–interference’ is a play with words, even when they first came with 
the notion in the 1950s and 60s, it was relative, they did participate in liberation struggles in 
Africa, they did interfere or assisted or supported liberating struggles in Africa so [those 
words] does not mean anything in any sense. 
Therefore, the reality of using ‘non–interference’ is to safeguard China’s own interest at home and 
abroad. However, the ‘non–interference’ principle which is central to China’s foreign policy is 
changing more dramatically, consistently with its hegemonic power. As many Chinese citizen settle 
and do business in Africa and abroad, and with huge investments from both the state and private 
companies, China realised that situation had to change. Cowaloosur (2016) even clarifies that many 
Chinese people are beginning to buy and invest in property development in Africa. Cowaloosur 
(2016) highlights South Africa as one of the countries that has benefited from Chinese property 
investment. For such reasons, China has become more practical in its dealing with Africa, and came 
to the realisation that oil rich countries in which it had invested a lot are faced with difficulties. 
Some of these difficulties are corruption and terrorism and other forms of racial and ethnic 
divisions. Such difficulties justified the intensification of China’s action to establish its first military 
base in Africa, i.e., Djibouti (Aronson, 2015).  
The above statements show and reaffirm Prah: (interview, conducted May, 2016), that China had 
long intervened in the affairs of African countries. Only this time the implications of China’s 
foreign policy are changing to focus on resource diplomacy. Countries with resources have seen 
China’s hegemonic power. For example, South Sudan, akin to Nigeria and recently Syria, have 
benefited from China’s aid, loans and other forms of assistance and trade deals. However, these 
countries and others have been under pressure to return the favour by awarding Chinese state owned 
and private business deals as a payoff for the help they had received from China. This again is a 
show of power and a manifestation of what more is to come as China continues to engage with 
African countries. 
Igbinoba (2016) also shows China’s hegemonic power at display and its strategic calculation of 
opening a military base in Djibouti. This illustrates that China’s engagement not only with Africa 
but with the rest of the developing countries in the world is based on its interest. Djibouti, unlike 
many African countries, has no mineral resources; its advantage though, is its geographical location. 
Djibouti is “Blessed with a deep natural harbour, its strategic location gives it access to the Gulf of 
Aden and the Gulf of Arabia, significant economic routes through which 20 per cent of global 
exports and 10 per cent of total oil export transits annually” (Igbinoba, 2016: 1). Consequently, 
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China through its economic power and military supremacy has managed to convince Djibouti to 
accept the opening of a military base. Part of the package that China offered to Djibouti is “to invest 
four billion US dollars in the construction of a railway line from Djibouti to Addis Ababa, capital of 
land–locked Ethiopia” (Igbinoba, 2016: 1).These are some of the packages that make African 
countries to allow China to have access to mineral resources and other strategic facilities that China 
uses to protect its own economic interests. Respondent 15 from Nigeria seems to have a similar 
view that China is in Africa for its own benefits and that China is determined to achieve that goal, 
even at the detriment of Africa.  
The Respondent further highlights that China’s intension is to conquer Africa, because for 
Respondent 15, China is only investing heavily in countries that are rich in minerals and minimally 
in countries that have no resources. Therefore, in the long run, China akin to Europe and the US, 
will do everything in its power to dictate for African countries and use force to impose their will to 
the continent. Respondents in general are concerned by Africa–China relations that if Africa is not 
careful, the relation with China can replicate that of Africa with the West, i.e., imperial domination. 
Although many of the Respondents state that they don’t see China using military force to conquer 
Africa, Power and Mohan (2010) along the lines of the 80 percent of the Respondents allude that 
countries with mineral resources are the ones in danger. This is because “China’s foreign policy is 
understood by some to be shifting from a concern with ‘ideology’ to a preoccupation with business” 
(Power and Mohan, 2010:1). As a result, the continuous economic rise of China has created new 
challenges of economic and energy diplomacy towards Africa. 
4.3 China’s economic and energy diplomacy towards Africa 
As noted earlier, China’s engagement with Africa is not new, but recently, China’s surging 
economy and its transformational agenda that started 37 years ago by Deng Xiopong, is sensed 
throughout the world. Deng Xiopong’s reform and openness placed Africa at the centre of this 
agenda (The Economist, 2008). Thus, economic diplomacy became the focal point on Africa–China 
relations. Although Africa–China relations expand to political, social and cultural interactions, 
economic and energy was and still remains the main focus. Africa possesses vast mineral resources 
that China needs in order to sustain its industrial programmes and to grow its economy. Moreover, 
China wants to access a market of a billion costumers for its thriving and booming manufacturing 
industry. Both, mineral resources and numerous customers are present in the African continent.   
It is worth noting that prior to China’s reform and openness to the rest of the world. Planned 
interventions were crafted and implemented across China, among other things that China 
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strategically did in order to leverage its chance of making sure that it gains the maximum benefit 
from the countries it engages. It made education to become the sole responsibility of the state, 
thereby, taking private schools and universities under government control and raising the standards 
of education (Chow, 2004). The intention was to make sure that China’s citizens are skilled enough 
for such reforms and openness. Moreover, social security systems were strengthened, with urban 
Chinese citizens covered under Government Insurance Scheme (GIS), which takes care of retired 
professionals, and Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS). This scheme is specifically designed to take 
care of retired enterprise labourers. While on the other hand, rural population continued with their 
three tier local system of accessing health care, of which the community is the main driving force of 
the programme (Chow, 2004).  
To single out some key vital aspects of which China radically transformed since its reform and 
openness programmes started, it is worth highlighting that it prepared its people to what will be 
China’s next adventure to the world (rapid economic growth). China has a skilled labour force, 
which works very hard and in many instances works more extra hours than many African workers. 
Such kind of work ethic is rare in many countries, particularly in Africa, where people work few 
hours and yet expect to be paid more. In addition, workers are protected by labour unions, which 
although very weak, they are feared by the business community (Schillinger, 2005). 
On the contrary, in China labour unions are not prominent neither are they vocal as in Africa. In 
short, labour unions are forbidden in China. It is for such a reason why workers in China are 
vulnerable. Therefore, this makes investors to prefer doing business with China, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector. This is because investors know that skilled labour is in abundance along with 
low salaries and wages. Yet in Africa, workers, although exploited as well and subjected to low 
wages and salary, have certain rights that scare investors (Schillinger, 2005). 
In spite of the above mentioned circumstances, the Chinese continue to invest billions of dollars in 
Africa. This is in sharp contrast with Western investors who always site security risks, weak 
governance and unclear labour regulations. Although labour regulations are present in Africa, the 
reality is that big businesses can easily overlook them and thus exploit workers. For example, 
Zimbabwean nationals have been complaining about ill–treatment and racism from the Chinese 
managers to their government (Tagwirey, 2013). However, it is difficult for the Zimbabwean 
government to be firm on these kinds of acts. Precisely because the Zimbabwean government and 
the majority of African countries rely on China’s FDI to address the socio–economic challenges 
facing the continent. 
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This vulnerability on the part of African countries has led certain Chinese companies to undermine 
laws and regulations across the continent. Therefore, China applies its hegemonic tactics in Africa 
by financial means and that makes it easy for China to undermine African countries. Although 
China continuously denies that it sees Africa only as a continent that should serve it with mineral 
resources, it is no secret that China has strategically positioned Africa at the centre of its economic 
circle because of the opportunities found in the continent. For example, Africa possesses the second 
biggest market in the world after Asia. Figure 2 clearly shows that Africa is indeed the second 
biggest market in the world. 










   
*Source: World Population Clock, 2016 World metres  
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Figure 2 indicates that China has access to the second biggest market in the world, which by large 
and far is growing at reasonable pace in comparison to other regions, despite the slow economic 
growth globally. What is interestingly is that many Africans are beginning to have purchasing 
power as many investments from the FDI flow to the continent. Another key sector that led China to 
have appetite for Africa, are mineral resources, especially oil and gas that China desperately needs 
to maintain its surging economy. Though, this sector (primary sector) which Africa relies for its 
economic growth is not assisting the continent much in terms of addressing socio–economic issues. 
Nonetheless, to some extent this sector continues to be one of the vital sources used in Africa. The 
















Table 1. The Development History of China’s Oil Industry  
Phase 1:  1978 - 1992  
Self-reliance and self-sufficiency are the key objectives of energy policy. The National 
Development and Reform Commission is founded and placed in charge of the energy sector. State-
owned enterprises can access limited foreign markets.   
Phase 2:  1993 - 1999  
Production of oil can no longer meet domestic demand. Government starts to conduct reforms to 
increase competitiveness of the SOEs. Enterprises start to seek oil in foreign markets  
Phase 3:  2000 - 2008  
“Go global” starts to become the main slogan and government encourages firms to go abroad. 
China’s accession to WTO further increases domestic business competition. SOEs and private 
firms expand their business worldwide.  
Phase 4:  2008 - present  
“Go abroad and buy,” is the response to the financial turmoil that began in 2008, and hastened 
China’s investment expansion at the global level. China’s investment in resource and energy 
sectors have increased dramatically. 
 
Table1 clearly shows the development of the oil industry of China. The Table chronologically 
indicates the role of government in pursuing its resource diplomacy to the outside world. Phase 4, in 
the Table above shows China’s hegemonic power and thus the rescue of most of the economies 
around the world. In 2008 the world was in economic and financial distress, with developed 
countries being the most affected. China on the contrary, was and is still expanding with 
investments in the world. Africa still benefits immensely from China because Middle East and 
North Africa, regions that supplied China with 60% of crude oil for years, have been marred with 
difficulties (Besada, 2013). 
These difficulties exploded in 2011 with uprisings taking place in some parts of the Middle East and 
North Africa. Amongst the various grievances that citizens held for far too long were corruption, 
patronage and high unemployment. Moreover, terrorism and weak state capacity to lead their 
citizens posed many risks for China and thus new markets became appropriate to keep up the supply 
of its economy and manufacturing industry. With these recalcitrant issues taking place in the Middle 
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East and in North Africa, China had to reconsider a strategy of recouping oil and other mineral 
resources (Besada, 2013).  
As a consequence, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in 2001 gave direct instructions of 
‘zouchuqu’ (go out) to state owned enterprises, to seek long–term access and stable supply of 
natural resources such as iron, steel, copper, manganese, petroleum and oil which is the strategic 
focal point of Chinese government. Chinese state owned enterprises went out, as instructed, to all 
parts of the world, from Europe to Latin America and Africa. It certainly became clear to the 
Chinese that “Africa is the last major continent whose oil fields constitute huge reserves that are not 
already managed primarily by Western energy companies, therefore available to China’s 
corporations” (Besada, 2013: 85). To have access to these minerals, China offered Africa better 
deals, which sought to address its socio–economic challenges. For example, China established 
import tax free trade agreements with many African countries. It granted aid, loans and cancelled 
many outstanding debts owed by African countries (Carmody and Taylor, 2010). These strategic 
calculations have helped China to sustain its level of economic development, which is growing far 
better than many countries to the extent that China is now the most influential country in Africa 
(Besada, 2013). 
Now then, many African countries see China as a strategic partner, to the extent that some of the 
citizens prefer Chinese goods over Western goods. For example, 9 of the Respondents interviewed 
agree that Chinese manufactured goods are more affordable and thus more accessible for many 
Africans to buy and sell in the business market. For the majority of the Respondents, Chinese 
thriving manufacturing is opening up business opportunities. This is because it enables them to have 
goods at a cheaper price and sell those goods at a better price and be able to make profit. However, 
Respondents 8 and 9 highlight that Chinese cheap manufactured goods are some of the causes 
killing the industrial sector in Africa. 
Prah also agrees that China’s thriving manufacturing industry is going to be of help to Africa. For 
example, he highlights that China is currently trying to relocate their manufacturing industry to 
Africa (Prah, 2016: Interview). Such a bold step will benefit Africa both in terms of job creation and 
skills. Moreover, Respondent 17, the only Chinese national located at China mall who agreed to be 
interviewed, also points out that Africa–China relations is good for both parties. The Respondent 
sites the exchange of goods between Africa and China as helpful for socio–economic development. 
This is because for this Respondent, the infrastructure projects initiated by China throughout the 
continent have made it easy for Chinese and African business to do business in and out the 
continent. The injection that China continues to pour through aid and other relief programmes to 
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Africa has for, Respondent 17, gone a long way in assisting Africa to address some of its socio–
economic challenges. The Respondent argues as well that to say that China is in Africa to conquer 
or extract mineral resources is mischievous. This is because China engages with African 
governments individually and the settlement between the two is in most cases what African 
countries agree with. Aid, loans and infrastructure grants are some of the benefits that China offers 
to many African countries and more importantly, China continues to invest in sectors that many 
Western countries are reluctant to invest (Huse and Muyakwa, 2008).  
China’s FDI in Africa had and to some extent continues to yield positive results. From 2012 to 2013 
alone, trade between Africa and China grew by 22%, while between Europe and Africa trade grew 
by 15% (Africa Economic Outlook, 2015). This indicates that Africa–China relations have and are 
still growing significantly. This growth is influenced by China’s acceptance of the prevailing 
political system in the host country in which it intends to operate. Thus, the notion of ‘non–
intervention’, which is strategically accompanied by hegemonic goals, is useful. The hegemonic 
tactics are used to extract mineral resources and to influence Africa to adopt policies that are pro–
China. One of the most effective strategies that China uses is its denial to be tagged as a developed 
state, preferring to be identified in the same category as its target, most of which are developing 
countries (Bijian, 2005: Carmody and Taylor, 2010). This strategy is effective because many 
African countries don’t see China as a developed country that wants to exploit them. In spite of all 
of the above, many African countries have grown exponentially, this fact will be detailed in the next 
section. 
4.4 African growth rates per regions 
Historically, and to some extent today, Africa still relies more on raw materials for economic 
prospects and development. This is despite the fact that it has arable land and good weather 
conditions to engage in other sectors of economic activities. However, since China has become the 
biggest trading partner, Africa had and still experience substantial economic growth. Africa has 
been growing faster than many regions, for example in 2004 Africa’s real GDP growth rate stood at 
6.1% and in 2007 at 6.6 % (African Economic Outlook, 2016). This shows that the growth 
trajectory grew at the fast pace and thus contributing to the Africa rising narrative, until the global 
financial crisis of 2008. This crisis saw Africa growing at 5.4% in 2008 and sliding down to 3.1% in 
2009; this resulted in many peoples of Africa regressing back to poverty and unemployment rising 
even higher (African Economic Outlook, 2016). However, in the following years, growth rate 





Table 2. Africa’s growth by region, 2013 - 16 
    (Real GDP growth in percent) 
   2013   2014  2015 (p)  2016 (e) 
Africa 3.5 3.9 4.5 5.0 
Central Africa 4.1 5.6 5.5 5.8 
East Africa 4.7 7.1 5.5 5.8 
North Africa 1.6 1.7 4.5 4.4 
Southern Africa 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.5 
West Africa 5.7 6.0 5.0 6.1 
*note (p) = Projections, (e) = Estimates 
Source: Statistics Department, African Development Bank (extracted from African Economic 
Outlook, 2015).  
  
The reason Africa is growing at the reasonable pace after the global financial crisis is in part due to 
the massive infrastructure projects rolled out in the continent by China, specifically, expanding 
public and private sector services and to increasing agricultural outputs (Diop, 2015). The Africa 
Economic Outlook (2015) adds on saying that majority of African countries have improved their 
conditions in terms of policy and implementation, and thus making it easy for investors to do 
business in Africa. 
Table 2 above shows that West African countries have been growing faster than the other regions in 
Africa. This is because of China’s huge investment in the West African region. However, there are 
factors which have played a significant role in reducing West African growth prospects and 
development. For example, the instability in the region because of Ebola outbreak in 2014 has 
reduced growth prospects. Many people lost their lives due to this outbreak. However, and as a 
realization of its global significance – China acted with haste in trying to address the Ebola virus, 
which killed many people in just a matter of days. China worked tirelessly along with the 
international community to fight the Ebola virus. Tiezzi (2015) suggests that China supports West 
Africa because it gains a lot from it. Although many people take this as opportunism and hypocrisy 
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from China, the reality is, however, that affected countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea 
all needed the cash injection to kick start socio–economic developments post Ebola era (Tiezzi, 
2015). 
Table 2 also points positive developments to Central Africa, which had also been doing well, 
precisely because policy rates were reduced to stimulate economic growth. In regards to East Africa, 
it showed a 7.1% increase in 2014, the highest growth rate compared to other regions in the 
continent. However, it declined by 1.6% in 2015 because of many uncertainties, for instance, 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda had some instability due to terrorism. Although this region continues 
to experience terrorism, it is responding well to get rid of terrorism and other forms of violence. 
On the other hand, Northern African has not performing to its full potential. This is due largely to 
political instability and the failure to make the democratization process to work for all their citizens. 
The effects of the Arab Spring uprising in North African countries are still felt across that region. 
Table 2 shows that during 2013 and 2014 the growth rate was very low in that region, only 0.1%. 
However, it gained momentum in the following years, although below its potential. Amongst the 
reason why Northern African countries are still facing challenges post Arab Spring uprising, is that 
North Africa was not used to democratic institutions for many decades, with socio–economic 
mobility enjoyed spatially across racial and religious divide. The Elbaradei (2015) speech on The 
Uprisings in North Africa and the Future of Our Continent, delivered during the 7th Thabo Mbeki 
Africa day lecture, captures very well why many Northern African countries and Arab Spring 
nations are growing below their potential. To quote him at length: 
Coming after decades of repression, where democratic culture and institutions were absent, 
people were not in a position nor had the tools to organize or compromise for the common 
good. There was no plan for the day after. Understanding the importance of social unity, and 
reaching a consensus on the basic values and laws that should govern a pluralistic  society is 
however fundamental for social cohesion. This is even more crucial during transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, when the focus should be on building a new democratic 
culture and new institutions, irrespective of the ideological differences. 
These difficulties, marred with the new breed of other corrupt leaders interested in power and self-
enrichment, make it challenging for many Northern African countries to prosper. The emergence of 
militant groups and the so called terrorists in this part of Africa had and more recently escalated to 
new heights. These grizzling realities continue to hinder progress in North Africa and make it hard 
for citizens to play a leading role in growing their economy. 
Table 2 indicates that Southern Africa countries have experienced low growth rate as well, when 
compared to other regions in the continent. Gumede’s book titled Post-apartheid South Africa, in 
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particular a section on “Post-colonial African Development Experience”, assists us on 
understanding why many countries in the Southern Africa and Africa in general have and continue 
to grow below par. The most fundamental problem Gumede highlights is that many of the 
developmental strategies adopted by liberation movements in post–colonial Africa have and even to 
date are still not working (Gumede, 2016) 
The failures of these states were both a combination of internal and external factors. Most of these 
are domestic factors which have and to some extent continue to hamper development in the 
Southern African region. For example, the new breed of post–independent African leaders replaced 
colonialism and apartheid with dictatorship (Gumede, 2016). Another problem which many 
Southern African leaders, and more broadly Africa leaders, have been scared of is making decisions 
that will empower African people. Instead they have been preoccupied with making sure that 
economic interest of foreign powers that have no other interests than exploiting the resources of 
Africa are safeguarded (Gumede, 2015).  
These factors accompanied by nationalist sentiments have indeed hindered development for many 
countries in the Southern African region. On the external factors, many Western countries, 
systematically using international institutions such as IMF and WB influenced policy direction. For 
example, ESAP and WC were enforced to the continent with the blessing of African leaders, 
precisely because of these policies were accompanied by aid and loans that Africa desperately needs 
for development. However, these policies have not work for this region of the continent. Instead, 
these policies have created and perpetuated poverty and underdevelopment. Moreover, corruption 
among the political elite and dependence on foreign aid has compromised dearly the African people 
(Gumede, 2010, Gumede, 2016). 
Diop (1999: 5) positions this more concisely stating that ‘‘African people’s aspirations have been 
shattered against a wall of dependence and authoritarianism, incompetence and corruption, thus 
creating the need of a second liberation of Africa.’’ None of the agreed plans by all African 
governments, since the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its predecessor, 
the African Union (AU), have been implemented (Diop, 1999: 5). Examples of these policy 
documents raging from regional integration, to cultural exchange and economic development are:   
 The Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development in Africa  
 African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 
 The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme  
 The African Charter for Popular Participation and Development 
 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights  
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 Charter for African Cultural Renaissance 
 Documents Relating to Human Resource Development, Science and Technology in Africa 
 New Partnership for Africa’s Development       
The above documents and others not mentioned were funded by external actors and thus having 
greater influence on what should constitute Africa’s development. Therefore, this is part of the 
reason why many of the agreed development strategies failed. Additionally, international financial 
institutions always ready to fund Africa’s development programmes, have and continue to make 
every effort to block Africans to craft on their own development policies (Gumede, 2016.) 
Moreover, the renewed involvement of China into Africa is also singled out as one of the problems 
that stop Africa’s development. 
4.5 Africa–China: Varieties of Capitalism, Communism and African Renaissance 
The rise of China in the 21st century on critical areas of scientific and technological fields, have 
severely weakened Western dominance globally and ushered in a Sino–centric system of state led 
capitalism (Ndlovu–Gatsheni, 2013). Gumede (2010) went as far as to state that the 21st century 
will be remembered as a century where Asian countries, particularly the People’s Republic of China 
ascended beyond any continent and country in the world. Secondary to it are South American 
countries such as Brazil and Chile (Gumede, 2010). China’s model, where a state plays more of an 
active and assertive role in driving political and socio–economic policies to advance development, 
has become a blue–print for many countries. Pang (2009) then asserts that almost all Latin 
American and sub–Saharan countries have adopted this model upon witnessing China’s rapid 
development.  
This is informed partly by the peculiar economic conditions caused by ‘unregulated free market 
enterprises’, which these continents and countries followed for far too long. The collapse of 
‘unregulated free market enterprises’ in the 2008 global financial crisis triggered by the drop of the 
mortgage sector and reckless lending by US banks and Britain, are part of the reasons why many 
governments in Africa view China’s political and economic system as a better way to respond to 
their challenges (Helleiner, 2011). The 2008 global economic crisis that is still felt across the globe 
is the most severe recession since the Great Depression of the late 1930s (Stiglitz, 2010).  
Stiglitz points out that the failure of global economy, resulting into the financial global crisis of 
2008 happened because of ‘unregulated free market enterprises’. The fundamentals of ‘free market 
enterprises’ is that government should not temper with the markets. The crumbling ‘capitalist 
system’, pursued through Washington Consensus and later neoliberal globalization, has been going 
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on for much of the late twentieth and early twenty first century (Beder, 2009). Scholars, policy 
makers and governments across the world were prompted to re–think the ways of socio–economic 
interactions between people and nations. Thus, after reviewing and re–thinking the advantages and 
disadvantages of the ‘capitalist system’, it became clear that such a system cannot address the 
challenges facing the world. For this reason, state intervention became an eminent solution as 
people were losing houses, and unemployment was souring to unacceptable levels. All this because 
free market enterprise and the crumbling banking system. Yet in contrast, China had been 
experiencing economic growth and pulling more people out of the poverty line.  
The global financial meltdown saw even the developed countries using the state to avert the 
crumbling capitalist system. For example, the US government rescued and nationalized the world 
largest insurance company, American International Group (AIG) (Helleiner, 2011). What the US 
and many capitalist countries did, contrasts with their widely held belief of neo–liberalism. The 
concept neo–liberalism draws its roots from ‘classical economists’. Many researchers trace the 
foundations of economic interactions and people’s movement to industrial revolution, which started 
in England around the 1780s and later spread to other parts of Europe and the world (Mckay, Hill & 
Buckler & Ebrey Beck & Crowston & Wiesner-Hanks, 2009).  
During this tenure, substantial breakthroughs in agricultural methods were discovered, also 
technological advancement in transport; infrastructure and energy suppliers were advanced together 
with foreign trade (Mckay, Hill & Buckler & Ebrey Beck & Crowston & Wiesner-Hanks, 2009). 
Mckay, et al (2009) then specifically asserts that the ‘classical economic’ paradigm can be traced 
from the Scottish philosopher, Adam Smith, who persuasively argued for a free–market system in 
his well–known book titled An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1979). 
Smith’s seminal work continues to guide modern economics and vividly informs capitalist notions. 
The central issue of the book was that for countries to grow economically and provide more jobs to 
their citizens, government should not intervene in the economy. This doctrine later became known 
as ‘Laissez-faire’, simply meaning that the government should not intervene in the economy, nor 
should the government impose tariffs from goods coming from outside (Smith, 1979). 
Among the reasons that Smith did not want government to intervene is that smaller companies 
would be outdone by big corporations. This would have forced government to favour certain big 
firms/companies and undermine the emerging ones. Thus, because of that, Smith advocated for a 
free–market system. Ever since then, the foundations of ‘classical economic’ rules have and 
continue being modified to perpetuate capitalism (Kotz, 2000). There is evidence that in post–
colonial Africa, big companies are taking advantage of small and developing companies in the 
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continent. Therefore, also playing a big role of hindering intra–Africa trade needed to stir up 
development. Capitalism in its various forms and manifestation continues unabatedly to create 
inequalities in the people’s ability to purchase goods and services (Hickel 2012). The failure of the 
adherence of ‘classical economic’ doctrine, to explain the pitfalls of capitalism, particularly as it 
relates to Africa, made matters worse. Keynes (1936), a leading figure in macroeconomics, 
therefore, challenged the ‘classical economic’ doctrine embedded in capitalism and free–market 
system. Keynes (1936) central argument was that the private sector should not be left alone to 
determine economic activities, nor dictate the needs and deeds of any society.  
For Keynes, the state should regulate capitalism and take responsibility by heavily investing on 
infrastructure and other related development programmes to stimulate economic growth (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 1986). This model is known as ‘embedded liberalism’ where capitalism is regulated by 
government so as to meet the needs of society (Hickel, 2012). Although ‘embedded liberalism’ 
produced positive outcomes in the 1950s and 1960s, it fell short in the 1970s and 1980s as 
liberalism re–invented itself on the basis that ‘embedded liberalism’ caused stagflation because of 
economic regulation by government (Hickel, 2012). 
Following a series of these events, both the proponents and detractors agree that neo–liberalism 
have shaped trade and international practice post World War II. Also, the fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union Block in 1991, along with the transformation of Chinese 
communist outlook to state driven neo–liberal policies, have changed the course of contemporary 
strategies on development and International Political Economy (Cox, 2004, Rodric, 2006). The 
detractors, who are mostly preoccupied with Development and International Political Economy, 
have turned to be critical of neo–liberalism, on the basis that it advocates for a free-market 
economy. Caffentzis (2002: 89) had this to say about neo–liberalism:  
Since the early 1980s, there has been a continuous attempt by the World Bank, the IMF and 
increasingly the G7 to introduce neoliberal programs to ‘solve’ the problems of African 
economy. From the recommendations of the Berg Report in the early 1980s, to the Structural 
Adjustment Programs of the mid-1990s, to the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy, initiatives of the late 1990s and the early 21st century each of 
the neoliberal “solutions” have failed and failed again.   
Against this backdrop, neo–liberal policies in various forms and shapes have and continue to create 
hardships for the peoples of Africa and more so those of Nigeria. Therefore, because of this and in 
most cases, opponents of neo–liberalism from Africa and other developing regions turn to see neo–
liberalism as a theoretical or rather an ideological outlook that stretches neo–colonial domination to 
Africa and part of the third world countries. Fantahun (2013) clarifies the rationale behind neo–
colonialism as something that can be understood as a usage of economic and financial strength to 
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advance global capitalism, business globalization and cultural‘ imperialism’ by Western countries to 
benefit their selfish interest at the expense of relatively weaker and economically smaller states. 
Currently, neo–liberalism is being advanced through business globalization mostly in the form of 
Multi–National Companies (MNCs). China has of lately, joined the global trade through state 
owned and private companies in order to acquire resources to maintain its economic growth (Ross, 
2013). Such a model where a parent company is located in one country, while other branches are 
located in a number of countries continues to shape contemporary neo–liberalism and business 
outlook.  
These companies have created severe problems, especially in Africa. For example, the Report on 
High Level on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (2014), chaired by former South African 
President Mbeki singles out these multinational companies as the biggest culprits dogging tax and 
other trade based activities. Then again, Western multinational co–operations, much like Chinese 
state owned and private enterprises continue to cause ecological and environmental problems, and 
further create dire humanitarian conditions for the peoples of Africa (Ruben, 2011). 
What makes the situation extremely worse is that China brings along cheap labour and pay lower 
wages, plus the workers work abnormal hours. These situations have multiple effects in the 
continent. For instance, Chinese workers repatriate all the profits to China while Africans continue 
to be unemployed and languish in poverty. Moreover, Chinese only employ Africans to do minimal 
work, while giving managerial jobs only to the Chinese. For these reasons, many Marxists are 
convinced that (MNCs) are historically tied to the capitalist aspect towards development, which by 
large and far stretches at an international level and imperial domination (Onyewuchi and 
Obumneke, 2013).  
This assertion by Marxists views generated much debates in Africa, in which many African 
nationalists and pan–Africanists viewed these MNCs and SOEs as a continuation of former 
colonisers and emerging powers as a neo–colonial imperialistic project to plunder African mineral 
resources. Alemazung (2010) along with his contemporaries, then argue that although Africa has 
been freed from the vantages of colonialism, Africa is still dominated by former colonizers and the 
so–called emerging countries like China. There is a feisty contestation among scholars on whether 
China is a developing country or a developed nation. This contestation arises because China still has 
attributes of a developing country: a largely poor rural mass with some parts of the country having 
pitiable infrastructure and a number of people still trapped in poverty. On the other hand, China has 
great facilities in major urban areas, it is the second biggest economy with huge foreign reserves 
making trade deals and unilaterally upgrading infrastructure in many parts of the world, especially 
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in Africa (Global Labour Strategies, 2008). This paradox often helps Chinese government officials, 
particularly in countering Western criticism, when explaining their position towards Africa. Despite 
their domestic problems, China continues to stretch a helping hand to African countries by 
providing aid, loans and better trade deals that are not at all accompanied by conditionalities (Wu, 
2013). China’s approach of not giving African countries conditionalities is been unreservedly 
welcomed and praised by many leaders in the continent. Contrary to aid or any form of assistance 
provided by the US and its allies, that use multinational cooperation and institutions such as (IMF) 
and (WB) to exploit developing countries, particularly Africa.  
Cisse and Kim (2013) hold a view that although Chinese SOEs and private companies take raw 
materials from Africa, China unlike the West, invests heavily in the host country through the 
building of roads, clinics and other important infrastructure facilities. Now then, proponents of neo–
liberalism argue that neo–liberal policies through institutions such as the (IMF) and (WB) have been 
successful to some extent in Africa. However, in a report published by the IMF (2015), respected 
Chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, admits that capitalism has failed humanity. It is outstanding 
that the IMF as an institution admits that ESAPs and WC policies imposed on Africa have failed 
dismally, despite claims from the West that there are some successes (Boas and Morse, 2009).  
Gumede (2010), one of the scholars who is against outside influence - be it either West or East-, 
long argued that part of the reason why Africa is not developing like other regions is because of the 
external hand that keeps on imposing policies on Africa. Gumede (2010) further argued that in the 
1980s, a new strand of thinking on economic development was informed by neo–liberal narrative, 
thus culminating with WC and ESAP, along with Poverty Reduction Strategy papers, none of which 
worked for Africa. However, because Western neo–liberal countries -such as the US - know that 
neo–liberalism and capitalism cannot survive and thrive without natural resources, many tactics 
have been applied to maintain capitalism. Asian countries, particularly Japan and China have within 
their own political and economic systems adopted some of the fundamentals of capitalism, thus 
clearly adopting Western strategies. 
Cunnings (1984) abruptly declare that East Asian planners mimicked Western countries while 
avoiding their errors, which include colonizing other nations and intervening in other nation’s 
domestic affairs. For example, China has strong ties with dictatorship regimes in Africa, and it does 
not intervene nor does it comment on the internal affairs of those countries (Talyor, 2007). 
Moreover, part of the strategy, same as Western strategies - that China and many Asian countries 
adopted were to incentivize their state owned companies, private sector and raised tariffs to protect 
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their industries. They also invested trillions of dollars into public sector services, such as health, 
education and entrepreneurship among others (Chang, 2003). 
With these various strands of capitalism and one party state communist China, Africa and many 
Africans have and continue to respond with Africa centred ideologies and epistemic outlook. This is 
informed by the historical pain that Africa endured for so many centuries. Immediately after the 
European conquest and colonialism took place in Africa, albeit what is referred as the scramble for 
Africa in the turn of the nineteen century, political and ideological battles that are with us up to this 
day were created in the minds and hearts of African people. Various African political and socio–
economic ideological outlooks emerged in Africa resisting colonialism and racism. Pan–Africanism, 
African Renaissance, and Afrocentricity are some of those ideological outlooks that emerged in 
responding to colonialism and racism. 
However, at the centre of these entire epistemic ideological outlooks, African unity was and still is a 
guiding principle. Meredith (2006) in his book The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of 
Independence, captures very well Africa’s post–colonial history. Some of the realities that Meredith 
(2006) chronicle vividly and honestly is what took place in the early decades of Africa’s 
independence: nationalist leaders such as Nyerere, Kaunda, Banda and Kenyatta amongst others 
became the founding fathers of their respective nations and that brought hope to Africa and its 
people. Sentiments of a united Africa resonated well with these leaders and went far to assist other 
African countries who were still under direct colonial rule.  
Solidarity amongst these leaders towards other African states was intact. However, with high 
expectations from citizens and with limited resources to deliver on their promises, new challenges 
emerged for these leaders. Some of the challenges were never foreseen during the struggle against 
colonial rule. The battle of ideological, economic and political systems created problems for many 
African countries. Many of the independent leaders were caught up between the glitches of 
nationalism, pan-Africanism, communism and capitalism. 
These various ideological, political and economic systems extremely hampered development in 
Africa. This is because African countries were either in alignment with capitalist or communists and 
as a result of that outside influence shaped post-independence Africa. On the other hand, ordinary 
people with high expectations from a free and independent Africa presided by these leaders, seemed 
disgruntled because of the slow pace with which development was and continue to take place. For 
many Africans, socio–economic development and transformation seem distant and theoretical. 
Faced with these mounting pressures, the leaders, scared of losing power, replaced colonialism with 
one party state, drawing inspiration from communism (Meredith, 2006).  
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For example, Jomo Mzee Kenyatta ruled Kenya for 14 years until his death and saw opponents as 
enemies. Banda in Malawi is another leader who ruled with iron first and crushed opponents. Many 
countries in Africa experienced dictatorship, monarchies and even military rule in some places. 
Such trends continued unabatedly with colonial tactics of political assassination for those who 
wanted multi–party system. Human rights, freedom and the culture of expression that these leaders 
fought for so hard were denied to Africans who differed from these nationalist leaders (Meredith, 
2006). 
The politics of personality cult rapidly emerged in order to maintain a political system that did allow 
those who differ a place to participate. For example, Nkrumaism in Ghana and Nassarism in Egypt 
are some of the cults that emerged immediately after independence. Cult personality spread 
throughout the continent accompanied by brutality, patronage, and tribalism in some parts of the 
continent (Meredith, 2006). These disturbing events in the first decade of independence slowed 
progress and socio–economic development (Meredith, 2006: 162). These forms of new constriction 
from African leaders, tied up from Western colonialism and corporate imperialism further created 
problems to the peoples of Africa. Moreover, the changing global order with the rise of China and 
other developing countries added more challenges to Africa.  
These emerging countries advanced rapidly and needed more resources to fuel their own 
development. Africa, with vast mineral resources, attracted new emerging countries seeking their 
own share, which became one of the challenges besieging the continent. In responding to these old 
and new forms of oppression, Gumede (2010), in a provocative opinion piece titled We need an 
African renaissance and pan-Africanism for a better Africa, covers what needs to be done clearly. 
Firstly, he gives a clear analysis on why Africa has been marginalized for far too long. For example, 
Gumede sites policy paralysis as a fundamental point creating failures in the African continent, as 
well as the failures of institutions and poor governance and leadership.  
Therefore, to address the socio–economic challenges and other aspects that slow development in 
Africa, Gumede (2010) proposes three important aspects that will deal with Africa’s socio–
economic development, i.e., thought leadership, thought liberation and critical consciousness. In his 
inaugural professional lecture, Gumede (2014) states that the only way to address the socio–
economic development in Africa is for African countries to employ thought leadership, thought 
liberation and critical consciousness. This trio, as Gumede argues, can advance socio–economic 
development in the continent. Many African leaders lack with urgency the trio that Gumede 
persuasively argues and which can solve the developmental challenges facing the continent. These 
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ingredients are necessary and should be carried concurrently together, to apply any without the other 
won’t make any concrete impact (Gumede, 2015). 
4. 6. Is China a hegemony?  
China has seen remarkable growth and development since the beginning of 1978. Diop (2015: 
online), World Bank Vice President for the Africa Region, captures China’s rise very well and states 
that:  
In 1978, China was among the poorest countries in the world.  Since then, China’s real per 
capita income has grown, on average, by more than 8 percent each year – this is indeed a 
striking level of growth. In contrast, per capita income in Africa actually fell consistent 
between 1976 and the mid-1990s. Since then, Africa has experienced consistent growth, but 
that growth has been very heterogeneous across countries, with countries rich in natural 
 resources growing much faster than those without.  
Many African countries that experienced growth in recent years are resource rich countries. China 
has played a significant role in making those countries achieve high growth rates. East African 
countries with oil reserves have been major beneficiaries as China’s search for oil grew heavily in 
the past few years (Berhe and Hongwu, 2013). Although these resource rich countries have seen 
significant growth in the past few years, trends between Africa–China relations indicate that China 
is benefiting more from Africa. In addition to that, presently, Africa relies more on China for socio–
economic and political survival. Therefore, with the latter developments on Africa–China relations, 
a question should be posed: Is China a hegemony? 
The above question is not an easy question to comprehend and therefore requires careful and deep 
analysis. Such analysis must be accompanied by the practicality of China’s engagement with 
African countries. What makes this question difficult is that the US is said to be an already 
hegemonic power that is influential globally. Many have even accepted the US international role 
and even the US itself had taken that upon itself to be the sole responsible leader in global political 
and socio–economic issues. However, Layne (2008: 13) gives a nuanced view saying that ‘‘there is 
mounting evidence, however, that this view is mistaken, and that, in fact, the era of American 
hegemony is drawing to a close right before our eyes. The rise of China is the biggest reason for 
this.” 
In responding to the question, Is China a hegemony?, a number of factors will be taken into 
considerations. Firstly, the literature presented as well as the above sections and the interviews 
conducted will be vigorously analysed. Moreover, the central tenets/characteristics of hegemony as 
presented by Schoeman (2007) will also be used to gather enough information and evidence to 
respond to this challenging question. China has taken a bold stance on defining and defending its 
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foreign policy goals, for instance, China had and to this day rhetorically maintains non–interference 
policy as a guiding posture of its foreign policy. It is clear and firm on its state identity and its one 
party outlook.  
Although major powers often criticize China regarding its non–interference policy and its political 
system of one party state, in practical terms, such powers prone to regime changes, have failed to 
challenge China and thus to change CCP. To make sure that liberal ideology and democratization 
remains a world view Western have pumped in money to Non–Governmental Organizations to 
promote democracy in developing countries. However, in China, Western intensions to influence 
the majority of Chinese to be pro–democratic have been in vain. These are indications that China is 
a hegemony on the international stage. It’s worth taking into account one of Schoeman (2007:74) 
central characteristic of a hegemony: ‘‘a hegemony strives for domination in and off the 
international system, or, at the very least, domination or control in its own region, whilst attempting 
to prevent another great power/s to dominate other regions.’’ In this case, China is striving and in 
fact it is a hegemony in Africa as the ‘other region’ (Schoeman, 2007). 
China’s demonstration of strength and dominance had been seen in African countries in recent 
years. The case of South Africa is just one case in point. For example, Respondent 1 highlights that 
the refusal to Dalia Lama an entry to South Africa shows signs of hegemonic relations between 
Africa and China. This is because economic considerations were some of the factors, which led 
South Africa to refuse Dalia Lama an entry. The thought of South Africa losing huge investments, 
aid and loans from China was going to damage an already South African struggling economy.  
Another central tenet as stated by (Schoeman, 2007: 74) that shows China as a hegemony towards 
Africa as the ‘other region’ is that ‘‘in materialistic terms, such a state would have superlative 
economic, military and political power.’’ For example, the usage of financial muscle to set up a 
military base in Djibouti to protect its economic interest is an indication and a show of power and 
strength by China (Igbinoba, 2016). Moreover, as a show of strength, China gives other countries 
resources so that they can provide public goods to their citizens. For example, South Sudan, 
Zimbabwe and many African states rely on China to finance some of their public goods 
programmes. China’s aid, loans and other forms of assistance had grown exponentially over the last 
two decades and are used as means of gaining advantage. Moreover, recently and despite many 
people here in Africa and abroad believing that China’s aid and loans to Africa are not accompanied 
by any set of suggested conditionalities, there is a variety of literature, which argues contrary to that 
assertion. Broadman (2013: 2) for instance, gives sterling examples on how China sways African 
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countries to give Chinese companies contracts at the expense of African companies. Below are 
some of the examples he cites:  
In Zambia, Chinese investors landed a deal to construct a $600 million hydroelectric plant. 
In South Africa and Botswana, Chinese firms have been building hotels and other tourist 
infrastructure. The Chinese telecom giant Huawei won contracts worth $400 million to 
provide cell phone service in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Meanwhile, Chinese firms are 
constructing roads, bridges, sewage systems and government buildings across the continent. 
 
This to a lager extent indicates that China is using financial muscles to influence African countries. 
Thus, when analysing Africa–China relations, the lens through which this unequal partnership is 
looked at, as many have noted, were Africa imports manufactured goods and exports raw material, 
makes Hegemonic Theory suitable to use. This is because big powers no longer question China’s 
communist outlook, and to this end, China continues to suppress those who question their political 
orientation at home, and does not tolerate international criticism against it. It shows that many states 
including the US can no longer threat China as it used to, thus an indicative of China’s global 
power. Moreover, China provides a leadership role in Africa that is consistent with its own values. 
Throughout the years, and to this day China takes many young Africans to go and study in China, so 
that they can understand the ways in which China operates and do things.  
 
Moreover, China’s outlook (2015), a study commissioned by KPMG, gives a broader and a much 
wider view on why China is more influential in developing countries. It highlights that with 
financial muscle at its disposal, many Chinese companies find it easy to invest in developing 
economies because laws and regulations are not tight. Therefore, unlike developed markets with 
tighter laws and regulations, developing markets are easily accessible and with the much needed 
financial aid in Africa, China remains an influential country. China is indeed a hegemony when it 
comes to Africa or to put it bluntly, China is a regional hegemony, and it fits all the hegemonic 
characteristics. 
4.7 Prospects and Challenges of Africa–China relations  
Although a large number of people living in poverty are still found in Africa, in recent years, Africa 
has been able to lift millions of its people from poverty. This is due to China’s financial assistance 
to the continent. To illustrate on this point, in 2006 alone, China committed about US $8.1 billion in 
three countries -namely Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique- for infrastructure related projects. The 
amount provided by China to these three African countries, is the same amount provided by the 
World Bank, France and the US combined to the whole of sub–Saharan region (Alden and Alve, 
2009). This shows that China places resources at the disposal of many African countries, despite 
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many arguing that China is not doing much for Africa. In addition, the evidence at hand shows that 
China has built many schools, bridges, railway and hydropower projects, which have gone a long 
way in eradicating poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. 
Moreover, Chinese investment in Africa serves as a balance to Western countries who have 
dominated African markets for centuries. Therefore, China’s venture into African markets, has 
given Africa the liberty to negotiate with the West on a stronger position because they are now 
competitive (Rotberg, 2008). China had and to this day continues to show commitment of assisting 
Africa in many respects, China has funded the African Union building in Ethiopia, it sends medical 
doctors to the continent and offers many bursaries to African students. However, there are also 
challenges facing Africa–China relations, one of them is that ordinary Africans are not benefiting 
from this partnership. For example, in many African countries, and to be precise in Sudan, Chinese 
companies are the ones getting contracts. These companies also bring their labour as well, as a 
result, nothing is left for the Sudanese people. In the long run, Chinese companies will face attacks 
from the host nationals, because of high unemployment. Haroz (2011: online) also states that: 
The challenge for African governments is to manage the fallout from Chinese imports with 
well-designed policies (i.e., compensating the economic losers with a portion of the winners’ 
proceeds) without resorting to protectionist tendencies. Chinese labour migration presents a 
similar dilemma for African leaders. Chinese workers compete with Africans for jobs; 
however, as Cadot and Nasir have shown, Chinese workers are often more productive than 
Africans. For example, Chinese garment workers in export processing zones produced 
nearly twice the daily output of their Mozambican counterparts. 
These are challenges that both parties, Africa and China, should work together in order to find 
solutions that will make the partnership to work in the long run. If some of the challenges are not 
addressed immediately, Africa-China relations will experience problems in the near future. 
4.8 Conclusion  
The above chapter had given a full account on Africa–China relations. It traced both historical and 
contemporary relations of Africa and China. During these periods, China had and still continues to 
play an important role in Africa’s development. This shows that China’s foreign policy has always 
centred on Africa – both for its legitimacy and economic interests. Chinas foreign policy has been 
adapting to the changing condition of Africa. Thus, it has been concentrating on Africa and recently 
it has focused more on energy and natural resources. This chapter had also shown that resource rich 
countries, particularly oil rich countries have been benefiting more from China’s investments. It also 
noted that part of the reason why Africa is not growing as it is supposed to, is because of the 
glitches of ideological outlook. The chapter also showed that China is indeed a hegemony towards 
Africa. Lastly, it had also indicated the prospects and challenges of Africa–China relations. 
64 
 
      CHAPTER 5  
   SINO–NIGERIA RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
5. Introduction  
This chapter deals with Sino-Nigeria relations. These two countries are the biggest populous nations 
in their respective regions. The changing dynamics of global political economy and Nigeria’s 
economy being surpassed by South Africa – two years after Nigeria became the biggest economy in 
Africa- is quite interesting. Moreover, the depth in which Nigeria’s economy declined to a point of 
entering in a full recession despite China’s continuous investment makes the Sino–Nigeria relation a 
unique case. This chapter starts by giving a background on the evolution of Sino–Nigeria relations. 
Secondly, Sino–Nigeria bilateral economic relations are unpacked to see whether Nigeria is 
benefiting or otherwise from China. Thirdly, China’s role in the socio–economic development of 
Nigeria is analysed in order to see whether China’s investment in Nigeria has a positive or negative 
impact. Challenges and prospects of Sino–Nigeria relations are also looked at. 
5.1 Evolution of Sino–Nigeria relations  
China’s first contact with Nigeria took place in 1960 when the Nigerian government invited China’s 
delegation to its Independence Day celebration (Gubak, 2015). However, shortly after that, bitter 
relations between the two countries ensued, due in part by China’s decision in 1968 to support the 
withdrawal of Nigeria’s Ibo–dominated Biafra region from the Nigerian Federal State. China 
supported this move not only in theory, but in practise by supplying the Biafran administration with 
open arms. However, China’s effort turn out to be in vain, as the Ibo tribe did not succeed with their 
intension of becoming a sovereign state and subsequently collapsed in 1970 (Mthembu–Salter, 
2009). A bit after this, such disputes were resolved and in 1971 formal diplomatic relations between 
Nigeria and China resumed (Mthembu–Salter, 2009). 
Odeh (2013) gives a clear perspective on why Nigeria had established what later became a strategic 
partnership for its developmental trajectory. During the 1970s, China had been gradually increasing 
diplomatic ties with many African countries. Moreover, during this period, China had been 
providing necessary financial distress to many African countries in the form of aid, loans and 
infrastructure gifts, such as roads, railways, schools, hospitals and other critical facilities. For 
instance, China built the “Tanzania–Zambia railway being the biggest aid project on the continent” 
(Odeh, 2013: 26). Moreover, Chinas’ continued modernization of its energy needs and its adventure 
to new markets led Nigeria to forge stronger ties with China (Oder, 2010).  
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Paradoxically, when China was enjoying successive economic growth and development, it is worth 
noting that during the early years of Sino–Nigeria relations, Nigeria was going through tough times 
internally. For instance, political instability with little or no economic prospects for the Nigerian 
population was the defining feature. Therefore, Sino–Nigeria relations produced little results, while 
other African countries were massively benefiting from China’s venture on the continent. When 
General Obasanjo took over as the Military Head of Nigeria in 1976, shortly after General Yukubu 
Gowon was overthrown as the Nigerian Military Head, Obosanjo noticed that Sino–Nigeria 
relations were happening at the expense of Nigeria’s socio–economic development. From this 
observation, General Obasonjo sent a delegation to China to address this give and take away 
relationship favouring China and not Nigeria, in other words, not being a win–win situation. (Odeh, 
2013, Danile and Maiwand, 2015).  
The Chinese government acknowledged the fact that it was indeed the one benefiting from Nigeria, 
consequently affecting negatively the socio–economic development of Nigeria. China then 
increased the aid package to send doctors, agricultural experts and scientists to assist the Nigerian 
government’s quest of eradicating poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. Although the aid 
package and other forms of assistance helped to some extent, it did not address the underlying issues 
of fair trade between the two countries (Odeh, 2013). 
5. 2 Sino–Nigeria: Bilateral Economic Relations (1971 - 2015) 
Sino–Nigeria relations continued to spark controversial debates within the Nigerian society. Some 
sections of the population viewed Chinese business enterprises positively for Nigeria’s socio–
economic development. While others, particularly business entrepreneurs - saw Chinese as a threat 
to their business ventures, to the extent that for them Chinese were undermining Nigeria’s economy 
(Talyor, 2007). Whether this is true or not, from the perspective of these two contending views, 
statistics of trade and socio–economic development trends will reveal which group of the two is 
correct. Agubamar (2014) gives an interesting account, indicating that the Sino–Nigeria relation is 
marked by growing trade imbalances, with the result of only favouring China. This is precisely 
because China’s economy is more diversified, which enables China to produce for export at the 
international markets. Conversely, Nigeria to some extent depends on oil to fund. China on the other 
hand sends manufactured goods such as machinery and other equipment to Nigeria (Egubula and 
Zheng, 2011). 
It is clear that Nigeria’s oil and gas deposits have attracted China to invest immensely in Nigeria’s 
economy. Moreover, Nigeria is one of the leading producers of oil in Africa, with 80 percent 
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revenue coming from oil (Talyor, 2007). Egubula and Zheng (2011: 9) citing a study that was 
commissioned by African economic research consortium, indicate that:  
China has established more than 30 solely owned or joint venture companies in the 
construction, oil and gas, technology, services and education sectors of the Nigerian 
economy. The report also found that FDI from Chinese private investors is mainly in the 
agro-allied industries, manufacturing and communications. By contrast, Chinese public FDI 
targets natural resources and infrastructure, particularly in power and transport 
In 2006 a historical landmark deal made by one of the Chinese offshore oil company (CNOOC) 
bought Nigerian gas and oil fields at the price tag of $ 2.3 billion. In return for this historical deal, 
China agreed to loan Nigeria $200 million to build telecommunication firms (Li, 2006). This deal 
indicates the Chinese commitment to Nigeria's oil sector. The table below extrapolates other 
Chinese companies that invested in Nigerians economy. 
Table 3. Major companies in Nigeria (1990s -2010) 
Companies Sector Assets 
USD 
(billon) 
Employees Investments in Nigeria 
SINOPEC Oil and gas 152.80 373 375 Blocks OML 64,66, 29% 
stake and operating rights to 
block 2, Nigeria- São Tomé 
Joint Development Zone 




Licences for OPL 
ZET Telecom 13.00 85 232 CDMA, handsets 
CCECC Construction 2.17 70 000 Rehabilitation of Palato-
Lagos expressway, Likki 
Trade Zone Refinery 
CSCES Construction, real 
estate 
58. 90  121 500 Refinery  
HUAWEI Telecom  25.00 51 000 Network, Handsets 
SEPCO Electric power 
construction 
38.90 19 756 Papalanto Plant 
CGC Construction 58.90 1 215 000 Refinery 
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CNOON Offshore oil and gas 13.8 21 000 45% interest in offshore 
exploitation license OML 
130  in collaboration with 
Dangot group for cement 
production line EPC 
projection in 2008  
 *Source: Egubula and Zheng, 2011 
 
Table 3, shows some of the Chinese companies who have found ground in specific economic areas 
of Nigeria such as telecommunications and infrastructure industries. The Table indicates that a 
number of Nigerians have been employed in these sectors, with some Nigerian big business and 
individuals benefiting from the joint ventures with China. This is the nature of Nigeria’s societal 
problem, were only the rich have the upper hand in gaining opportunities and in most cases through 
corrupt practises. Moreover, these companies are not disclosing all the necessary and vital 
information that could help Nigerians and those interested in China’s venture in Nigeria to assess 
clearly China’s role in the socio–economic development of Nigeria. For example, the Table doesn’t 
show the number of women who are employed by these companies, neither do they report clearly 
where the foreigners come from and lay bare the assertion that these companies are hiring only 
Chinese. Even on their website and annual reports, such information is omitted. 
Furthermore, some of these companies have a history of not fulfilling their agreements when 
engaging with Nigeria. To illustrate on this point, in 1997, when Nigeria was hit hard by sanctions 
from the West under General Sani Abacha for human rights record, Li Ping, then Premier of China 
State Council, paid a visit to Nigeria and signed a number of deals including agreeing to rehabilitate 
Nigeria’s railway. However, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) never 
honoured the commitment made by Premier Li Ping to rehabilitate the railway as promised (Odeh, 
2013).  
Despite such shortfalls, Sino–Nigeria economic relations intensified further and in 1999 when 
Nigeria returned to civilian administration, president Obasanjo -who had first-hand experience with 
China, when he dealt with them during the years of military rule-, provided Chinese with 
opportunities in Nigeria’s stake. For instance, many Chinese business enterprises were given 
contracts for their solidarity and continued support during the difficult years experienced under 
military rule, this subjected Nigeria to a pariah state. Among the companies that can be singled out 
is CCECC which was given the biggest contract to build 5000 housing units to shelter athletes who 
participated at the all–African games in the year 2000 (Odeh, 2013).  
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The second term of then President Obasanjo, saw an intensification of Sino–Nigeria relations, with 
him visiting China twice, and then with the then Chinese President Hu Jintao and his Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabo visiting Nigeria back. These visits led to key strategic establishment of the China 
Investment Development and the Trade Promotion Centre in Nigeria, as well as the Nigeria Trade 
Office based in China. This was an important step taken by these two countries in enhancing their 
economic and trade relations, thus in 2006 the Nigeria–China Investment Forum was founded 
(Egbula and Zheng, 2011). Adekola (2013) sums up well Obasonjo’s vision and Nigeria’s economic 
ties with China, i.e., oil for infrastructure projects. Talyor (2007: 640) mentions some of the deals in 
which China and Nigeria entered into: 
Chinese corporations, with Beijing’s support, have also invested in Nigeria’s transport 
sector, with a 25–year railway development plan that comprises a wholesale redesign of the 
existing railway tracks and an ambitious expansion of new lines to areas of Nigeria 
previously not serviced by rail. The Nigerian government signed a $2.5 billion loan facility 
with China in October 2006, much of which will be used to ﬁnance the refurbishment of 
Nigeria’s railway system. In all, an estimated 7800 kilometres of standard gauge railway 
network, to connect all 36 state capitals and major cities in the country, will be built by 
concession–holders, which then will be responsible for infrastructure upgrades, expansion 
and maintenance, and train operations. The entire railway modernization and expansion 
project is estimated to cost over $30 billion. However, in early 2007 the Chinese government 
sought Nigeria’s pledges that the new modernized rail line contract, which spans Lagos to 
Kano, and was awarded to the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction Corporation 
(CCECC), would be completed as and when due without any debt encumbrances. 
 
When Obasanjo left office in 2007, his successor, Umaru Yar Adua, reviewed oil for infrastructure 
policy that guided Sino–Nigeria economic relations and cancelled many oil for infrastructure 
projects. The Late President Umaru Yar Adua, who passed away in May 2010, preferred the 
exchange of oil for cash, and this did not yield sufficient impact for the people of Nigeria. This is 
because the money that was injected to Nigeria’s economy - never went to development related 
programmes, because most of it was stolen by government officials (Egubula and Zheng, 2011). 
Agubamah (2013) gives a well–informed perspective on how President Goodluck Jonathan, 
successor of Umaru Yar Adua, engaged China partly from an economic point of view, which was 
different from his predecessors. Former president Jonathan followed on Obasanjo’s footstep to seek 
infrastructure development and aid assistance from China. In 2015, he paid a visit to China with the 
intension of strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries. This visits resulted in the 
signing of 1.5 billion US dollars intended for infrastructure development in Nigeria, including the 




China indeed views Nigeria as a strategic partner. Recently, President Buhari, following on his 
predecessor’s footsteps, seemed to further deepen and consolidate relations with China. During his 
visit to China, an additional amount of $6 billion was secured for various Nigerian economic 
sectors. For instance, $1 billion is allocated to develop a Hi–tech industrial park at Ogun–
Guangong. China even went to the extreme of committing to finance a 300 Mega Watts solar power 
in Niger Delta (Premium Times, 2016).  
Niger Delta is a region where some of the militants are based, and they have since the early 1990s 
run the region amok, by kidnapping schoolchildren and conducting large–scale terrorist’s attacks. 
Part of the reason why there has been continuous fight in that region, is because many different 
ethnic groups are claiming a stake in the oil sector. Yet the government has allowed many 
international companies, mostly Chinese state owned enterprises, to invest in that sector. This has 
made China to be number one lender to Nigeria, despite political instability in strategic regions such 
as Niger Delta, where there is oil, which China needs. Political instability along with violence had 
scared Western investors, but China seemed determined to invest despite these impediments 
(Bradsher and Nossiter, 2015). 
5.3 China’s role in the socio–economic development of Nigeria 
The role of China in the socio–economic development has had both positive and negative effects on 
Nigeria’s economy. For example, the African Economic Outlook (2015: online) indicates that:  
The economy has enjoyed sustained economic growth for a decade, with annual real GDP 
increasing by around 7% (it was 6.3% in 2014). The non–oil sector has been the main driver 
of growth, with services contributing about 57%, while manufacturing and agriculture, 
respectively contributed about 9% and 21%. The economy is thus diversifying and is 
becoming more services-oriented, in particular through retail and wholesale trade, real estate, 
information and communication. 
The positive aspects on Nigeria’s economy are due to improved relations with China. What makes 
China even more acceptable to Nigeria is that when it raises concerns that China is the one 
benefiting from Nigeria, China does not contest that, instead, it goes back to the negotiating table, 
and it seeks to find solutions. Conversely, Western countries do not want to be seen as wrong doers. 
The Africa Economic Outlook (2015: online) captures well the HDI and GEM: 
Nigeria’s ranking in the 2013 Human Development Index at 0.504 has slightly improved 
from 0.471 in 2012 but Nigeria remains a low human-development country. Efforts to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals have paid off in some areas but challenges 
remain. The MDG Survey report for 2014 provides the most recent education indicators. At 
national level, net attendance (used as a proxy for primary school enrolment) declined to 
68.7% in 2014. The net attendance rate stood at 84.3% and 62.2% in the urban and rural 
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areas respectively. At 91.6%, the male primary school completion rate is higher than it is for 
females (83.2%). 
Although significant strides have been made in uplifting the lives of women in Nigeria, there 
remains a significant gap in the socio–economic empowerment, leadership positions and political 
participation of women in Nigeria. Part of the reason why many women in Nigeria are subjugated 
and discriminated against, is because of customary laws and practices that continue to be carried out 
(Agbalajobi, 2010). Customary laws have and continue to disadvantage women in many respects, 
not only in Nigeria but across the globe. In some societies, akin to Nigeria, they prefer sending 
males more than girls to schools, precisely because of the held believe that if males are educated 
they will take care of their siblings (Lasiele, 1999).  
These stereotype attitude towards Nigerian women have compromised their socio–economic 
involvement and more so their political participation, despite the fact that women constitute half of 
the population of the country. In Nigeria the idea of women in politics is seen as evil and rude to all 
men, even the educated ones reject the notion of women participating in politics (Ekpe, Eja & John, 
2014). Agbalajobi, (2010: 78) captures the stereotypes working against women in Nigeria and states 
that:   
Some consensus has been of the belief that Nigerian politics is based on high political virility 
– those who have all it takes to compete in the turbulent environment; those who possess the 
wherewithal to take it by force when force is required; those that can march violence with 
violence. This consensus belief that men possess the superiority strength, competitiveness, 
are self-reliant and are prepared to tussle in political endeavour, whereas women are 
considered too passive to engage in politics and governance 
As a result of this, far less women hold top and managerial positions, both in the private and public 
sector service. The available statistics thus far indicate that Nigerian women have never held more 
than 15% of elected office barriers. Moreover, when comparing women participation in Nigeria to 
other African countries, Nigeria has been performing badly over the years, particularly in the 
National Legislation with 5.9%, compared to “Uganda (34.6%), South Africa (43.2%), Ethiopia 
(27.7%), Cameroon (20%), Niger (12.3%) and even the DR Congo (8.0%)” (Ekpe & Eja & John, 
2014: 16). Although the number has grown over the years, it remains significantly low when taking 
into consideration that women constitute half of the population of Nigeria. The Figure below 













*Source: World Bank, 2014 
In addition to the above concerns, the living standards of women in Nigeria are still low, despite 
progressive policies and legislation in place on how to advance the needs of women (Agbalajobi, 
2007). Figure 3 also shows that women representation in Nigeria is not increasing dramatically and 
thus it paints the picture that they are still subjugated in many ways. Discriminatory attitudes of 
male towards women in Nigeria are so entrenched in a way that it has become an entitlement for 
male to dominate political and socio–economic activities. Women are only reserved minor jobs, 
such as trading and nursing; even the kind of jobs reserved for women must serve men, so women 
are perpetually being side lined when it comes to economic activities (Lasiele, 1999). 
5.4 Challenges and Prospects of Sino–Nigeria relation 
Although China continues to play a leading role in financing Nigeria’s infrastructure projects, one 
of the challenges that seem difficult to address is that China continues to bring its work force to 
build these much needed infrastructure projects in Nigeria. This has kept many Nigerians out of 
work and as such, China’s investments do not in any way assist Nigerians with employment and 
skills. Taylor (2007: 361) also exposes other challenges facing Sino–Nigeria relations and asserts 
that:  
The Nigerian textile industries are in the process of shrinking as a whole or shutting down 
entire plants for good. The main culprit behind the Nigerian debacle is the Chinese invasion 
of Nigerian markets. Chinese fabrics in the Nigerian markets are readily and cheaply 
available for the Nigerian consumer and the latter is compelled to buy Chinese rather than 
Nigerian textile products. Because China is endowed with massive intensive labour potential 
and relatively skilled man power in its respective industries, Chinese products including 
textile fabrics are now ubiquitous in African market 
Additionally, it can be noted that China’s investment in Nigeria is only concentrated on mineral 
resources, particularly oil and gas, while supplying cheap and low quality manufactured goods. This 
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is a dangerous trend, because it makes Nigeria to be a perpetual ‘consumer state’, and as a 
consequence, the relation plays a more crucial role in killing Nigerian owned industries (Odeh, 
2013). Although China employs some Nigerians in various sectors (see, Table 3), it often gives 
Nigerians minor jobs, which are not based on skills and thus not empowering ordinary citizens. 
There seems to be a lack of policy coherence in place on the side of Nigeria to deal with China. 
Gumede (2016) also highlights an important factor which has dearly compromised the Nigerian 
economy. For example, the huge amount of revenue that Nigeria received and continues to receive 
led it to neglect the agricultural sector which dominated and helped Nigeria’s economy for a long 
time.  
Ujumadu (2016), citing a worrying report published by the UN on Nigeria Common Country 
Analysis, states that Nigeria is a deeply divided nation. The report further notes that poverty, hunger 
and underdevelopment in rural areas are severe. Moreover, this report points out that females are the 
ones who suffer more than males (Ujumadu, 2016). Although many challenges face Sino–Nigeria 
relations, there are also prospects for both parties. For example, China invests heavily in Nigeria’s 
economy, provides the much–needed infrastructure, which makes it easy for transporting goods. 
China also makes funds available through aid, and loans. Recently it has committed to give Nigeria 
$6 billion for the country to kick start its ailing economy (Premium Times, 2016). What is more, 
Chinese companies continue to hire thousands and thousands of Nigerians, although not enough 
(See, Table 3). 
The above discussion shows that to some extent and through these various interventions, China is 
assisting Nigeria to try to address the problem of unemployment and underdevelopment. Some of 
the positive aspects in recent years is that China has been expanding its pool of investments in non–
oil sectors, thus also unreservedly assisting Nigeria to diversify its economy, and to rely on other 
sectors for its economy to grow. Finally, the exchange programmes between the two countries 
greatly benefits Nigeria because the scholarships that China provides to many young Nigerians to 
study in China is very important since many young people return to the country well equipped with 
technological skills which are required by modern societies. Below is the transcript of the interview 
with Dr Kwesi Jepong Lwazi Prah, which describes in detail the relations between Africa and 
China, and also between Nigeria and China. This interview is important because it gives the full 





Oral testimony (telephonic interview, available on Voice Record)  
Section. A: Questions relating to Africa–China relations.  
1) Please, introduce yourself 
(With laughter), My Name is Dr Kwesi Jepong Lwazi Prah, a lecturer at East China Normal 
University in Shanghai, Department of History. 
2) Based on historical and current realities, in your view, do you think the Africa-China 
relation is good for Africa? Whether Yes or No, please explain. 
It’s a very generic question, it’s a simple question, the issue is a lot more complex than that, the 
relations between Africa and China are both ancient and Modern, contemporary. So you know it 
depends on how you understand the nature of relations, at what level you understand the nature of 
relations. At this present neither good nor bad, it’s what we make out of it, it’s what we construct 
out of the relations that matters. But for the specifics of future human relations, it’s a very important 
era where Asia is becoming more and more vis vesa so this why we, as me and you engage this topic 
because we trying to connect these realities so that we move forward as a human family. ’ 
3) Many scholars argue that China is in Africa for its own benefits, others put this bluntly and 
say, China is an imperialist. Based on the Africa–China relation, can this be said to be true? 
Please explain.  
That is a very, very complex issue, it has many spheres of influence, for one, for an example, to say 
that China is in Africa for its own benefit, that is partially true if not true in one degree. Because no 
state operates on someone’s else interests, China operates based on its interest and concern, so 
naturally US does the same thing, Germany does the same thing, Kenya and Tanzania will do the 
same thing with South Africa, every state has its own interest in whatever relationship that it 
engages in, so that is beside the point. The question that China is in Africa for its own interest is nil 
and void, of course it is in Africa for its own interest, but it’s how we use that relationship to engage 
the Chinese to make sure our interests are taken care of. Secondly, the question of imperialism is 
very tricky, and also, I would not say it’s dangerous, but I would say controversial way to 
understand the current position. As things stand, whether people conceive the current international 
order as an imperialist order, or we are in a state of fluid nor is it free, we are in a political and 
economic engagement which is neither imperialist or, we are in a vacuum of some kind, it depends 
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how you understand the current group of economic structure and function of capitalism. It depends 
on how one sees the idea of state as a development tool for the human being, for the citizen, 
imperialism is a very real thing to me as a historian because we are still suffering from the 
consequences of colonialism and that was an imperial project. Whether that applies to China is 
another story. Historically, China never interacted in a way that suggested it had what they call 
‘imperial consents’ in Africa, expanding capitalist activities, however, today we are seeing signs 
that there is a possibility that if they are not careful they could start replicating very, very uneven 
and unconstructive relations which could be at the extreme term an imperial agenda. But up to this 
point one cannot throw this word out as if it's a common language, do you understand the idea of 
imperialist?, this is actually a historical process, it's not just a word that is superficial  
4) Over the years, China's foreign policy of non-interference had taken a u-turn and recently 
we have seen China cooperating on peacekeeping missions under United Nation bodies. Does 
this indicate that China is accepting the international responsibility that comes with being a 
hegemony? In addition, what are the implications of that for Africa? 
This question is tied into the question before, you using words like hegemony and this is tied to the 
concept of imperialism, it is clearly stated in China's foreign policy pigeon, it's an anti– hegemonic 
directive in pursuit in each of their five year foreign policy plans. That they are not seeking to 
replace emperor, not seeking to replace America emperor or replace British emperor, they are 
trying to balance the financial distribution of wealth. They are to put their foot print in the part of 
the world where they previously not present, so this question is actually also linked to the last 
question in that they are seeking anti–hegemonic stance and they have been since communist party 
came into being. However, their stance with non–interference is a play with words, even when they 
first came with the notion in the 1950s and 60s, it was relative, they did participate in liberation 
struggles in Africa, they did interfere or assisted or supported liberating struggles in Africa so that 
word does not mean anything in any sense. The actual interaction, which some Western will call 
imperialist, but anyway, because they have interests in Sudan, they have interests in West Africa, 
have interest in East Africa, so they are going to have to ensure that security is positive in those 
regions, so the terminology is very relative and use as rhetoric. So that when they get to the global 
platform. Then they can say they have a policy of non-interference, but when you start investigating 
the activities, the word interference means you trying to manipulate a situation. That also a point of 
argument, is China trying to manipulate a situation?, is China trying to manipulate a war between 
South Sudan and Sudan?, is China trying to interfere in the war between Al-Shabaab and Nairobi? 
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This is about to you to argue but for me, I am trying to highlight facts that we have to be critical 
that it is called non–interference, because they are actually engaging in the internal affairs of 
African countries. 
Section B: Questions relating to Sino–Nigeria relations.  
5) In your view, do you think the Sino–Nigeria relation is good for Nigeria? Whether Yes or 
No, please explain. 
Any bilateral relations interaction with an Africa state for me is going to draw a very big problem, 
not because it is wrong, but it is hard wired, it's because its wreak, because the end result is not 
beneficial to the people's in their spaces. What I call African people in their political spaces, if we 
are operating as a Nigeria, as a Kenya, as a Botswana, as a South Africa we are isolated in a 
capitalist system in itself, in that the relationship is going to be one way, because Nigeria is such a 
loss in many levels. They are heavily in debt, lack of transparency in financial regulation, they are 
so many tears in which Nigeria is at the deficit in comparison to China and by the time they reach 
the table it is Nigeria asking for more, it's Nigeria asking for resources, products that ordinarily any 
citizens could make. The terms and conditions are already lopsided, it's just that how each deal 
brings in a little more financial aid, for example, you see they trying to do an Angola model were 
trading resource for so called development projects , oil for building houses or schools, coco for 
building roads or so on. These deals are built in such a way, precisely this problem, state have such 
a weak, financial systems, weak enforcement agencies. We are hard wiring the conversation, in fact 
the whole topic has to be rephrased in the sense that our bilateral relations with Africa states 
benefiting Africa people. That's another whole problematic topic, an issue, but rightly so it will 
benefit a company or two or three, it will benefit few thousand people, it will benefit the economy 
for ‘x’ amount of years, but in the long run, I have less optimistic feeling about it due to the 
historical legacy of colonial state in Africa and how it reproduces expectations, how it reproduces 
monopoly, how it reproduces political monopoly, dictatorship. We are perpetual in this problem 
because we believe that our countries are legitimate in this capitalist system  
6) China had and continues to invest billions of dollars in Nigeria's economy, especially on 
infrastructure related programmes; however, on the other hand, the living standards of 
Nigerians continue to deteriorate. What can be the courses of that?  
That's it, so my previous answer therefore complements this next question, we are now at a state 
where we are realizing that perhaps the developmental models we are using are not healthy. Banks, 
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the medium in which people should be basing their infrastructure projects on, for example a group 
of people in a region in Nigeria cannot take out loans because they have no collateral. The only 
collateral is their cultural artefacts, is what they make as a results of cultural customs and norms. 
But the so called global capitalist system does not want their products for whatever reason or does 
not price the products properly, are we at the loss, are we inherently always at a loss, because of 
this lack of integration with global terms of trade. What they call production cycle, if you loan a 
country some money, so that they can produce certain goods, which you need, but if Nigeria has no 
goods that China needs then how is going to bargain, and obviously people are going to suffer 
because then people cannot go to banks, to take out loans, because the banks don't have money, 
does that make sense? The reserve Bank of Nigeria has to be paying a lot of debt and therefore, they 
have to raise interest rate to get money into the reserve back, so we are perpetually killing this 
catch up while China comes in buys in something for very cheap, at least when you say, give aid for 
infrastructure project. Infrastructure is very important, it's what you do in and around that 
infrastructure, you can build roads but those roads mean nothing if you have nothing to transport.  
7) China's interest in Nigeria is motivated by oil and other strategic resources that China 
needs to fuel its own economy. Because of this, do you see China's involvement in Nigeria's 
socio-economic development being constructive? 
China's involvement anywhere on the earth is very constructive, because they have very specific 
way to interact with the environment and what their people needs in terms of resources, 
consumption. They are very efficient at understanding these process of demand and supply, they are 
very efficient at manufacturing and they are now trying to relocate their manufacturing hubs, 
manufacturing industries. Africa could benefit from this export of skills, not necessary from the 
technology they are exporting, but from the type of industry, they are exporting out of their country. 
Yes it is beneficial in a sense that people are going to acquire skills which is going to change their 
livelihoods. Whether that is a good thing or a bad thing, I don't know, if people learn how to make 
cell phones it's a good thing that they want to learn, but is it good thing that they want to have cell 
phones is another thing story. It's relative to the community that is acquiring a skill, for example, 
it’s relative to the community that's getting the money to build whatever they need to build. Again, it 
tiers into to the point of the distribution of the so-called monies and the managing of those monies 
and for what purpose. Again, the African state has got a very serious problem, especially Nigeria 
with corruption, with maladministration and so on. So it becomes a very, very serious issue were 
billions of Niari, Yerembu or Dollars disappear and there's no accountability for that. This is 
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China's main concern anywhere in Africa, its either that or the regulations are to string, it can only 
be beneficial to my eyes, unless we did not pay good attention and put into the relevant expertise to 
understand the terms and conditions that they put into our table 
8) Women have been at the receiving end of poverty in Nigeria and the fact that China is 
sending cheap manufactured African made fabric to Nigeria has kill the textile industry and 
many people lost their jobs. Do you think Nigeria can undo this kind of trade pattern where 
China sends manufactured goods and extracts raw materials? 
That is a very good question and is not a Nigerian problem, it's a global problem. I know where my 
father comes from they produce very beautiful cloths and that is a cultural practice so we as 
Africans should build institutions that protect us and value of our product against this so call global 
demands for textile. Remember it's all about dogma, about brand price, if something get made in the 
West it is the most valuable price, but if something is made in Nigeria it’s worth less, for example 
we don't have the control of these valuation process. So this is a primary task, because if we go to 
these deals we are going to be short-handed, because textile have been made here every day, mass 
production has been occurring in China for decades and decades, so we are not at that state of 
mass production. But, we have been trying to build mass production industries, but we are going to 
be short-handed, simply because of our population, skills base and so on. But on a brighter side, we 
have cultural practices that can encourage us to produce textile and add value to the world, it's up 
to us whether we consume and appreciate these textiles. I think the question is problematic of 
course, China is selling textile cheap because they are producing a lot but we don't have to buy 
Chinese products if we know there is an African textile producer who is producing a thing of good 
quality. The problem that was faced in Tanzania, were they had textile industries and producing 
locally, they price themselves out of the so called market because of the pressures that the banks 
were putting on them to pay back loans and so on. Basically, if we’re operating on strictly bilateral 
basis we’re always going to run on this process of being undervalued, being cheated, so called 
industries closing down because of higher, stronger financial powers so, we will be able to recover 
if we build our own institutions around our costumes and cultural values.   
 
5.5 Conclusion  
The chapter above had covered exclusively the nature of Sino–Nigeria relation. It highlighted 
clearly that although Nigeria is reaping some rewards from China, the impact is not positive to the 
ordinary people of Nigeria. On the other hand, China continues to be the one benefiting from 
78 
 
Nigeria’s oil and gas reserves using its financial muscle as a hegemony. The chapter also states that 
women are suffering more than males; it is stated that opportunities are not scarce for females, the 
problem that makes women to be marginalized is the cultural and traditional believes. This is not 



























 CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY AND CONCLUSION 
6. Analysis of the Study 
Africa–China relations in the past three decades changed the course of contemporary world history. 
This is because, as conquered people in the last five hundred years, they have emerged as a force to 
be reckoned with. In the last three decades, relations between Africa and China have managed to 
pull millions of people in their respective regions out of the poverty datum line. What’s more 
striking is that China rise since the 1970s happened without giving into the pressure of Western 
views and US liberal ideology of democratization, as well as without threatening other states 
militarily, or with force or cohesion (Breslin, 2011). This is remarkable because when a rising 
hegemony overtakes a hegemonic state, tensions between the two states often turn violent. 
However, with China, the case is different. They never intend to fight any country, let alone the US, 
theirs, as they regularly invoke, is a peaceful development and goes with ‘non–aggression’ towards 
other nations. Nevertheless, there is substantive evidence at hand, that China is operating as a big 
brother towards Africa and thus as a hegemonic power. 
Indicative of this, is that as China continues to extract raw materials from Africa and send cheap 
manufactured goods, which by large and far undermine Africa’s own industrialization process. 
Oloruntoba and Gumede (2014), note that the only way to address Africa’s socio–economic 
problems is through making sure that intra–Africa trade is prioritized. However, it would seem 
difficult for Africa to do that, because on one hand it relies much on China, and on the other hand, 
China is preoccupied about security, its energy needs and to make sure that its manufacturing 
industry has consistent customers.  
Hegemonies, throughout the turn of the 19th century have been operating in a similar manner, 
where they make it a point that they secure energy needs and protect their manufacturing industries. 
In recent times, evidence shows that countries that have mineral resources are vulnerable to 
hegemonic powers; for example, the US invading Iraq and Libya for energy purposes. Thus, since 
Africa contains strategic resources, it has become a tactical centre for world powers, either through 
proxy wars, during the cold war era, or globalization through multinational companies. Therefore, 
China’s economic rise in recent times has without any doubt challenged the US power in many 
ways. For example, China has managed to dominate Asia and Africa, these regions were 
predominantly dominated by the US, but China has overtaken the US in these respective regions, 
80 
 
more so through economic power. China has been able to transform itself in such a way that it 
wields, in materialistic terms, economic, military and political power (Layne, 2008). 
This is because big powers no longer question China’s communist outlook and to this end, China 
continues to suppress those who question their political orientation, yet not to international level of 
criticism against it as before. It shows that many states including the US can no longer threaten 
China as it used to, thus indicative of China’s power. On that note, relations between Africa and 
China show that China continues to provide many African states with public goods. For example, 
South Sudan and Zimbabwe and many African states rely on China to provide public goods.  
Moreover, China provides a leadership role in Africa that is consistent with its own values, thus it 
takes as many young Africans to go and study in China, so that they can understand the way in 
which China operates. This is part of the Chinese show of hegemonic influence (Layne, 2008). 
Indicative of this, is that China had and continues drastically to invest in Africa, it continues to 
provide loans, aid and other trade benefits to Africa. Thus, because of such, it is inevitable that 
Chinese rhetorical proclamation of ‘non–interference’ towards other nations is going to change. 
More so, because as it goes out to search for the much needed energy to grow its economy, along 
with their citizens going abroad, it has to change its strategy to deal with the outside world.  
Therefore, it is clear from the Chapters in this study that China’s foreign policy is changing due to 
the need of resources required for their economy. Part of the reason why China’s changing foreign 
policy might be dangerous for Africans, is that in the future, because of internal conflicts which 
have and continue to be witnessed in some of the African states. China might, because of that, side 
with authoritarian regimes that protect their interests, and ignore the rights of ordinary citizens who 
might be fighting for a just course. This can be done through sending or selling arms to regimes that 
use them against their own people.  
The study also shows that China provides Africa with a new source of generating revenue, however, 
the trade patterns, which were and are still applied by Western countries towards Africa, have not 
changed. As a result, it restricts Africa to perpetually become a continent that has to consume and 
supply China with raw materials (Agubamar, 2014, Alden, Large & Oliveira, 2008). It would seem 
difficult for Africa to reverse this pattern while it still depends on China for its own survival. What 
is important to Africa in this current state is for the continent to enhance and enable the environment 
to be conducive for intra–Africa trade so that it can lessen the burden of depending on other states 
who seek to exploit the continent. However, such change will never be easy for Africa to do because 
it would mean that China along with Europe and America would not benefit from trades with 
Africa. Moyo (2016: 63) succinctly puts it well saying that:  
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During the 1990s, liberalization created a space for capital from both the West and China. In 
the context of the African de-industrialization that escalated from the late 1980s, the West 
played a more dominant role in the export of consumer goods to Africa. However, during the 
2000s, Chinese consumer exports have grown, and in some sectors (e.g. textiles, shoes) they 
have become the dominant import. Although the overall trade between Africa and China has 
grown, cumulatively speaking, the combined Euro-American trade and investments still 
dominate the African business scene. However, in some countries, especially in the oil-rich 
African countries, new Chinese investments in oil and infrastructure have begun to shift the 
balance in favour of China and its presence has substantial inﬂuence in its political economy 
(e.g. Angola).  
Therefore, strategic resources that Africa possesses, makes it relatively vulnerable to big powers, as 
they make it a point that Africa remains a de–industrialized continent. Yet post–independence era, 
and more recently to be precise, we have seen the rise of corrupt activities across the continent. 
Hence, the problem of why many African countries have relied on China - is because China is not 
very strong and keen to check towards corruption and maladministration in African countries. As a 
result, corruption in the continent proves to be sustainable because of the funds from China come 
with no accountability, however, this makes China to have more leverage on African governments. 
In an interview, Prah (2016) also highlights the point that corruption is one of the issues that makes 
ordinary people not to benefit from China’s investment because the money intended for sustainable 
development projects never reach the people.  
Moreover, there is strong evidence offered by the literature and interview respondents that China is 
indeed operating as a hegemony towards Africa. To place this in context, currently, Nigeria’s 
exports to China are estimated at $1 billion dollars, while China’s exports to Nigeria are 
approximately at $3 billion dollars. This is a trade gap of $2 billion dollars, which clearly indicates 
that Nigeria is not benefiting from China as proclaimed by some in Nigeria and many around the 
globe. Moreover, a negative spin off from Sino–Nigeria relation is that China continues to send 
cheap manufactured goods, particular in the textile industry. Moyo (2016: 59) puts this well by 
placing “China as a “sub-imperial” force leading the scramble for African resources only as a 
tributary component of Euro-American hegemony”. 
This continuing trend contributes negatively in the well–being and socio–economic development of 
Nigerians, to the extent that Trade Unions in the textile industry reportedly claim that about 350, 
000 Nigerians lost their jobs in the manufacturing industry due to Chinese imports (Agubamar, 
2014). This categorically shows that China’s role in the socio–economic development of Nigeria 
contributes negatively: it provides minimal jobs to Nigerians and continuously brings cheap labour 




6.1 Conclusion  
This study, using a qualitative method of gathering data, shows that indeed Africa–China relations 
are not benefiting Africa. The research also shows that China is a force to be reckoned and that it is 
a hegemonic power towards Africa as a region, as well as in regions such as Asia and others. This, 
then possess a danger towards many African states and their people as it can make China to use 
carrots and stick threats going forward. This has been tacitly implemented strategically by China 
towards Africa. Africa is heavily in debt and China continues to create conditions which cause 
African countries to rely more on it through aid and loans.  
This is also the case with Nigeria, which recently, has been granted a loan of $6 billion, despite the 
fact that it already owes China billions of dollars, which Nigeria has not been able to repay. These 
loans constitute a clever way of China to get access to Nigerian oil fields and gas, and at the same 
time, to make sure that it has a stable market for their cheap manufactured goods. For that reason, 
for Nigeria to benefit immensely from China, it needs to put policies in place that benefits 
Nigerians. It further needs to kicks start its own industrial sector, by incentivizing it and protecting it 
against Chinese imports. This will in turn assist Nigeria to provide jobs to a large number of 
Nigerians, specifically women, who continue to suffer from poverty and underdevelopment. 
Moreover, Nigeria must improve their regulations and fight corruption within their system, so that 
the aid and loans that it enjoys from China can actually benefit the people. This study can therefore, 
be used to analyse Africa–China relations through the lens of Hegemonic Stability Theory, and can 
conclude that the fact that China continues to give Africa much aid and loans, grants China an upper 
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     Questionnaire for China mall  
 China’s changing foreign policy and resource diplomacy towards Africa: The role of China in 
the socio–economic development of Nigeria.  
 
Date of the interview ........../............./......... 
        
    Semi-structured questionnaires  
This questionnaires aims to gather data on China’s changing foreign policy and resource 
diplomacy towards Africa: The role of China in the socio-economic development of Nigeria. 
The responds are kindly requested to answer questions with honesty and integrity. The 
researcher assures that information given in this questionnaire will be used for this research 
and kept strictly and with confidentiality  
...................................................................................................................................................... 
Section 1: Background information  
1. Country of Origin  
1.1 China  
1.2 Nigeria 
1.3 Any other  




21-35  35-70 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
1. 2 2 Sex  
Female   
Male   
 





Section 2: Questions relating to Africa–China relations. 
2. Based on historical and current realities, in your view, do you think Africa–China relation 








2.1. China’s quest for Africa’s mineral to fuel its own industrialization has been 
unprecedented in the past three decades. Therefore, do you think China is employing 
imperialistic tactics? Because Africa continue to export raw materials and import 









2.2 China’s foreign policy of non–interference over the years had taken a u–turn and recently 
we have seen China cooperating on peacekeeping mission under United Nation bodies. Does 
this indicate that China is accepting international responsibility that comes with being a 
















Section 3: Questions relating to Sino–Nigeria relations.  











3.1 China had and continues to invest billions of dollars to Nigeria’s economy, especially on 
infrastructure related programmes; however, on the other hand, the living standards of 














3.2 China’s interest in Nigeria is motivated by oil and other strategic resources that China 
needs to fuel its own economy, because of this, do you see China’s involvement in Nigeria’s 





















3.3 Women have been at the receiving end of poverty in Nigeria and the fact that China is 
sending cheap manufactured African made fabric to Nigeria has kill the textile industry and 
many people lost their jobs. Do you think Nigeria can undo this kind of trade pattern? Were 
China sends manufactured goods and extracts raw materials?  
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